Australians in the Gulf War 1990 to 1991

About the conflict

Iraq invaded its oil-rich southern neighbour, Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, completing its invasion in 2 days. In occupying Kuwait, Iraq gained control of approximately 20% of the world’s oil. Not only was the invasion a breach of international law, but there was also concern for the security of neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

Following the invasion, the UN Security Council (UNSC) was hurriedly convened to discuss the invasion of Kuwait. In the days that followed, the council passed 3 resolutions seeking a diplomatic solution.

On 2 August (New York time), the UNSC passed Resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and demanding an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. This was passed on the same day as the invasion.

On 6 August, the UNSC passed Resolution 661, which imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. It called on member states to ban all trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait. This was passed after Iraq’s failure to withdraw forces.

On 9 August, the UNSC passed Resolution 662, which formally declared that Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait was illegal. The council endorsed continued diplomatic efforts ‘to put an early end to the occupation’.

Each of these resolutions was an important step, in line with the UN Charter, towards enabling UN member states to go to war to liberate Kuwait.

Australia’s military commitment

The Australian Government was quick to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, acting with speed to impose sanctions.

On 10 August, prime minister Bob Hawke announced that Australia would help enforce the embargo on trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

Hawke later recalled:

From the very beginning of the crisis in the Gulf I believed that Australia had vital interests at stake. Of course oil was important … the security and price of oil would be in jeopardy. More important, however, I was appalled by the thought that such a blatant act of aggression should be allowed to stand.

[Bob Hawke, quoted in The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, vol. 1, Australia and the New World Order, 2011.]

The initial commitment was to send 3 RAN warships to join the US-led multinational force in the Persian Gulf. The purpose of the Coalition naval task force was to create a maritime blockade of Iraq and Kuwait.

Although Australia's commitment was limited, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, later said, ‘It was a force that could make a real and realistic contribution’.

It was also historically significant as the first deployment of Australian warships to a war zone since the Vietnam War.

For the initial deployment under Operation Damask, the RAN selected:

• the guided-missile frigates, HMA Ships Adelaide and Darwin
• the replenishment (supply) ship, HMAS Success.

Adelaide and Darwin were equipped with sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-shipping missile systems, defensive anti-missile systems and 2 helicopters from the RAN Fleet Air Arm.

Success had one helicopter but no dedicated air defence system, so the Army provided its air defence capability.

Leaving Australia

It was a huge task for the commanding officers and their crews to prepare the ships in a few days for a deployment that could involve combat. Captain Russell Shalders recalled the preparation of Darwin:

We all have special memories of the 72 hours … everyone involved worked with a will and resolve that I’d never experienced before.

[Russell Shalders, quoted in Australia and the New World Order.]

Darwin and Adelaide left Sydney on Monday 13 August, and Success left Sydney the next day. The 3 ships met off Tathra Head in New South Wales. Between them, their crews totalled more than 600 officers and sailors.

When farewelling the crew of Darwin at Garden Island, the prime minister said they were leaving on ‘an extremely important mission’ for Australia and the world:

because if the end of the Cold War is in fact to usher in an era of peace then the world at large must be able to show that it is capable of giving effect to the principles of the United Nations charter … I am proud and I know that all Australians are proud we are able entrust this mission to such a well qualified force. I hope and trust that your families will share with us this sense of pride and that will help the balance of what I know must be the pangs of parting.

[Prime minister Bob Hawke, quoted in Australia and the New World Order]

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Journey to the Gulf

The transit to the Gulf was focused on training with help from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

While still sailing off the Australian coast, the RAN and RAAF worked together on simulated attacks and electronic jamming to prepare the ships’ crews for service in the Gulf. Leading Seaman Lindsay Jordan, a helicopter technician on HMAS Darwin, later recalled the intensive anti-air warfare and damage control exercises:

probably slept about four hours … day and night we would hear the roar of F-111s or F-18s attacking the ship, and we were constantly going to action stations … it was just full on.

[Lindsay Jordan, quoted in Australia and the New World Order]

The 3 ships were cramped because each took extra personnel. On Darwin, many of the helicopter maintenance crews and interpreters slept on stretchers in the ship’s conference room.

Army detachment

On the way to the Persian Gulf, the ships stopped at the HMAS Stirling naval base near Fremantle in Western Australia to finalise equipment and supplies on board.

Elements of the Australian Army's 16th Air Defence Regiment joined HMAS Success, which had no air defence capability of its own.

Also joining Success were RAAF Flight Sergeant Sam Halim, an Egyptian-born interpreter who acted as a cultural advisor, and an accredited journalist and press photographer.

Reaching the Persian Gulf

While the ships were at sea on 23 August, the Cabinet approved the rules of engagement.

The rules restricted the Australian ships to actions required ‘to identify, contact, interrogate and warn relevant vessels’, rather than fully ‘intercept’ shipping, as US and UK warships and others in the multinational force could do. The rules of engagement stated that the RAN warships could fire in self-defence.

A week later, Cabinet agreed to expand the rules of engagement so that crews could also take actions ‘to halt all designated vessels in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and stated destination and ensure strict implementation of the UNSCR [UN Security Council Resolution] 661’.

On 28 August, while Success replenished both ships, Commodore Don ‘Blinky Bill’ Chalmers, commander of the Task Group, met with the ships’ captains and operation teams to discuss the rules of engagement. Then on 31 August, the ships received supplies at the US base on the island of Diego Garcia.

On 1 September, Rear Admiral Ken Doolan, Maritime Commander Australia, who also had operational command over the forces deployed to the Gulf, signalled his first operation order for Operation Damask to Commodore Chalmers. The order explained that the mission was ‘to prevent the import or export of all commodities and products to or from Iraq or Kuwait’.

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Maritime Interception Force

Less than one month after leaving Australia, the RAN frigates joined the Coalition’s MIF.

The MIF was a 17-nation naval task force engaged in intercepting merchant ships believed to be sailing to or from Iraq.

It was one of the largest groupings of warships since World War II, including 6 aircraft carriers, 84 other warships and over 100 other vessels.

Medical support teams

On 25 August, Australia agreed to increase its military commitment.

The Minister for Defence authorised the deployment of two 10-person surgical teams to serve aboard the US hospital ship, USNS Comfort.

The 2 teams combined were known as Task Group Medical Support Element One.

The group was commanded by Surgeon Captain Kerry Delaney, RAN, who specialised in nuclear, biological and chemical countermeasures. Coalition forces worried that Iraq might use biological and chemical weapons.

The medical group comprised 17 regular RAN members, 2 naval reservists and one Army doctor. The group included 6 servicewomen.

The group left Australia on a Qantas flight on 17 September and arrived in Bahrain the next morning. The Australians went straight to the Comfort and became an integral part of the ship’s medical staff.

Duties of those who served

The Australian ships arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 3 September.

The 2 frigates immediately began interception operations. This required personnel to halt and board merchant vessels, including super tankers.

The main tasks for Australian personnel were:

• issuing warnings about shipping movements and possible threats
• interrogating the crews of ships they intercepted
• boarding intercepted vessels, later in the war, by boat or fast-roping from helicopters.

HMAS Success made regular voyages to replenish food and other supplies for Australian and Coalition naval vessels. Across the war, Success carried some 8,000 tons of supplies. It also received and delivered mail between ADF personnel and their loved ones and community members back home, including schoolchildren.

In a letter back to schoolchildren, one soldier wrote of daily life on board Success:

We get a wake up call at 6,30 am every morning. We start work at 8 am and work till 4 pm. Then sometimes during the night we do a 4 hour watch. So we are getting very tired.

[Gunner Robert Sonogan attached to HMAS Success, quoted in Australia and the New World Order.]

Personnel in the ships also experienced uncertainty during this time. It was unclear how Iraqi forces would respond to vessels being intercepted and boarded. There was a possibility of missile strikes and sea mines in the Gulf waters. A fear that the Iraqis could resort to using chemical or biological weapons in the region.

On 8 October, HMAS Adelaide fired warning shots over the bow of an Iraqi cargo ship whose captain had refused to stop. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that a RAN ship had fired machine guns while on operations.

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Mounting tension

Although facing overwhelming international opposition, including the vast military might of the US in the MIF, Iraq's leadership remained unyielding.

In September, the Iraqis announced that:

The attempts of those who wish to restore the situation [to the pre-invasion state that existed] before August 2, are impractical and futile.

In mid-September, Iraqi troops opened the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and some 6,000 Kuwaitis took the chance to escape. In Australia, the press reported on a businessman who joined the fleeing throng. He described the situation in Kuwait as:

intolerable, with Iraqi troops ransacking houses and shooting young men suspected of being Kuwaiti resistance fighters.

Boarding the Al Fao

The crew of HMAS Darwin participated in their first interception and boarding of a ship on 14 September.

Working with the US Navy’s USS Brewton, HMAS Darwin fired a warning shot over the bow of an Iraqi tanker, MV Al Fao.

Some 4 hours after the initial interception, a boarding party of US and Australian personnel searched the vessel and checked its documents. Members of the boarding party wore body armour and carried weapons and radios.

Boarding a ship was physically and mentally demanding for those taking part. They had to be prepared for possible resistance on board and meticulously search all accessible areas of the ship.

The Australians learnt a lot from the US personnel, who were very experienced in boarding and searching vessels. They later practised their new skills with simulated boarding exercises on their supply ship, HMAS Success.

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End of the first naval deployment

During the first 3 months of operations, the MIF had:

• identified more than 4,400 vessels in the Gulf region
• boarded some 500 ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman
• fired authorised warning shots in 10 incidents, 5 of which involved the Australians.

The naval operations quickly shut down almost all shipping in and out of Iraq to enforce the UN sanctions.

Three key factors ensured the task groups’ success:

• Iraq was heavily dependent on external trade.
• Iraq was geographically disadvantaged, with ports easy to blockade and only one neighbouring country that allowed trade (Jordan).
• The sanctions and naval operation received broad international support.

On 28 November, Rear Admiral William Fogarty, the US commander of the MIF, said:

The embargo is working. We know that. Saddam Hussein is not getting any oil out, or any cargo into his country by sea.

[Rear Admiral William Fogarty, US Navy, quoted in Australia and the New World Order.]

On 3 December, Adelaide and Darwin left the area of operations when 2 other warships arrived from Australia.

Success remained in the region for the time being.

Adelaide and Darwin arrived in Darwin on 14 December and reached their home port of Sydney on 21 December, in time for Christmas.

New naval deployments

For the second deployment under Operation Damask, the RAN selected:

• the guided-missile frigate HMAS Sydney, with 2 helicopters
• the older and larger guided-missile destroyer, HMAS Brisbane.

This was Brisbane’s second war, having served on the gunline during the Vietnam War.

By this time, the Gulf War was moving towards a combat phase. The Coalition forces were preparing to liberate Kuwait. This meant there was a heightened possibility of combat operations.

When Sydney left Sydney on 12 November to join the MIF, 18-year-old Able Seaman Darren Brown explained to a journalist:

It’s different this time. Before the war was a possibility – now it’s a probability.

[Able Seaman Darren Brown, quoted in Australia and the New World Order.]

On the morning of 3 December, Brisbane and Sydney met Success, Adelaide and Darwin at the outer edge of the area of operations for a handover. Then Brisbane and Sydney proceeded to the Gulf of Oman.

Success remained in the Gulf to support Brisbane and Sydney.

On 29 November, the UNSC passed Resolution 678, giving Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait.

On 4 December, prime minister Hawke announced that, if conflict occurred, the Australian task group could serve with allied forces in operations authorised under UNSCR 678. This meant the Australian warships could enter the Persian Gulf and cooperate with allied warships in the MIF.

More medical personnel deployed

Australia also deployed another 20 medical personnel to relieve the 2 medical teams serving in the USNS Comfort.

They left Sydney on a commercial flight on 31 December – New Year’s Eve.

After a handover of responsibilities, the first contingent left the operational area and arrived back in Australia on 7 January 1991.

In response to a request from the US Navy, Australia then agreed to send another two 10-person medical teams. The new teams, which left Australia on 12 January, comprised a mix of RAN, Army and RAAF personnel.

Departure of HMAS Westralia

On 9 January 1991, the tanker HMAS Westralia sailed from Geelong, Victoria, to replace Success.

Westralia was the largest ship in the RAN at the time. It sailed carrying 14,000 tons of diesel oil and 1,000 tons of aviation fuel to support the 2 warships in the Persian Gulf. Its normal crew was 8 officers and about 50 sailors, but it had 83 crew for its Gulf deployment, including a detachment of 16th Air Defence Regiment gunners for anti-aircraft protection.

Significantly, 7 of Westralia’s crew were female, including 2 officers. Westralia was the first Australian warship to be deployed to a war zone with female officers and sailors in its company.

The Westralia female crew members were not the first Australian servicewomen to serve in the Gulf War. The medical teams deployed to the USNS Comfort included female medical staff. Nevertheless, this was a significant development in the history of the RAN.

As a result of the deployment of female sailors, the ship’s departure generated a lot of media interest. The ship’s officers and sailors did not welcome media coverage that focused almost exclusively on the gender of some crew members. They hoped that all crew members could be respected as service members irrespective of gender.

Westralia’s captain, Commander John Moore, told one reporter that women had ‘been at sea since Noah sailed in the Ark. Men who can’t accept that are dinosaurs’.

Westralia reached the Gulf region after the combat phase of operations began, replacing Success so it could return home to Australia.

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Build-up of Coalition ground forces

The build-up of international forces in the Gulf region continued while the MIF was intercepting shipping in the Gulf region.

On 7 August 1990, US president George HW Bush ordered the organisation of Operation Desert Shield. This was 2 days before the UNSC formally declared that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was illegal.

From 7 August until 17 January 1991, this first phase included the buildup of Coalition forces in and around Saudi Arabia for the planned liberation of Kuwait.

UNSCR 678 set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. It also authorised member states to use ‘all necessary means’ to remove Iraqi forces if they had not been withdrawn already.

Across the border in Saudi Arabia, a multinational task force numbering in the hundreds of thousands was preparing to enforce the UNSC’s resolution. The task force was dominated by the US but comprised personnel from 30 countries.

Operation Desert Storm

On 17 January 1991, following Iraq’s failure to withdraw its forces from Kuwait, Coalition forces launched the combat phase of Operation Desert Storm. It started with air strikes against Iraq.

Australian sailors aboard Brisbane and Sydney were woken up to the call of action stations and informed that an offensive campaign would begin in the early hours.

New naval duties

With the beginning of the air campaign, Sydney and Brisbane ceased their maritime interception role. Both ships joined the anti-aircraft screen to protect Battle Force Zulu, which included up to 3 US Navy aircraft carriers.

For the next 6 weeks, until the ceasefire was called, RAN personnel performed:

• anti-aircraft screening (main task)
• aircraft control
• escort duties
• search and rescue.

The RAN ships were in danger from sea mines, and their crews faced the possibility of air attacks. Fortunately, there were no serious incidents involving the Australian warships.

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Ground operations in Iraq

On 24 February 1991, after more than one month of aerial operations, Coalition troops crossed the Saudi border into Kuwait and Iraq.

Several Australian service personnel who were on attachment to British or US forces took part in the ground operation and associated air and naval operations. Each of the services was represented.

Army officers served in US and British armoured and infantry formations, as well as others in intelligence and planning roles.

RAAF pilots flew with British and US squadrons, including in transport and tactical airlift roles.

RAN officers served in British warships, including mine countermeasures vessels. At least one Fleet Air Arm pilot flew with a Royal Navy helicopter squadron.

At least 20 ADF personnel were serving in exchange in planning, intelligence and support roles. Some personnel were also attached to the Australian embassy in Saudi Arabia.

A small group of RAAF imagery analysts was based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, along with a detachment from the Defence Intelligence Organisation. The analysts were identifying Iraqi targets, such as tanks, guns and armoured personnel carriers.

Working in Riyadh was potentially hazardous. When Iraq began to launch Scud missile attacks on Riyadh from 18 January onward, the analysts had to put on physically restrictive biological and chemical warfare protective clothing. Recalling the first night of the loud Scud missile attacks, Flight Lieutenant Margaret Larkin said she ‘experienced real fear for the first time’.

Iraqi withdrawal

The Coalition’s aerial and naval bombardment continued for 6 weeks.

On 24 February, the Coalition launched a ground assault aimed at pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. The land campaign was stunningly successful, taking only a couple of days to achieve the objective.

Australian Lieutenant-Commander Peter Nelson took part in the liberation of Kuwait. He was a RAN Fleet Air Arm pilot attached to the Royal Navy.

In the early hours of 26 February, while it was still dark, Nelson flew a Sea King helicopter in appalling weather with poor visibility and over unfamiliar desert terrain. His task was to evacuate 2 casualties from a forward medical station.

Nelson was awarded the British Air Force Cross for his actions. The citation explained that he landed ‘in full view of the continuing tank battle to the south’, picking up the casualties and then delivering them to a field hospital, ‘an exceptional feat of life-saving aviation in which he displayed outstanding courage and selfless dedication for the benefit of others’.

On 26 February, US president Bush called a ceasefire as Iraq's armed forces had been ordered to withdraw from Kuwait to the positions they had held before the August 1990 invasion.

The Coalition declared victory on 28 February 1991.

As Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait, they set fire to hundreds of oil wells. This created one of the war's most enduring images. An Australian operating theatre assistant remembered the scene each night:

just flames in the distance … and that’s all we could see.

By day, the skies over the region were blackened by thick, acrid smoke, which added to the pollution from the war.

Persian Gulf War plumes

Casualties and controversy

In the waters off Kuwait, an Australian surgeon on USNS Comfort recalled that ‘everybody was a bit tense’ when the land campaign started. However, the war proved relatively uneventful for the medical teams on board the fully equipped floating hospital.

The Comfort never came under fire. Fortunately, Coalition casualties were quite light, with the ship receiving only one combat casualty. Other casualties were treated at hospitals on land. Instead, the ship's medical team was occupied by a steady stream of accident victims and people with illnesses.

Some 100,000 Iraqis were killed in the conflict. Estimates vary depending on whether these statistics include military or civilian deaths and whether they refer to deaths or total casualties. Coalition fatalities were fewer than 200, with no Australians killed during the war.

Although the Coalition had won an overwhelming victory, there was controversy about the US decision to allow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to retain power. Some believed the fighting should have continued until Coalition forces seized Baghdad, but that would have far exceeded the terms of the UNSC’s resolutions authorising the liberation of Kuwait.

Aftermath of the Gulf War

Australia's defence involvement continued in the Gulf region.

In March 1991, a team of RAN clearance divers started working alongside British and US forces. They cleared unexploded ordnance and booby traps from coastal installations and the waters around Kuwait. Although the war had ended, the task was dangerous, and the diving team remained busy for more than 3 months.

One of the conditions imposed by the UN following the end of the war was Iraqi no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq. Over the 10 years that followed, several Australians serving on exchange with British and US air forces helped enforce the no-fly zones.

The northern no-fly zone was also intended to assist Iraq’s Kurdish population, which faced the threat of retribution from Iraq’s regime for their support of the war.

As part of the international effort to assist the Kurds, some 75 ADF personnel deployed to northern Iraq. The tri-service contingent joined an international effort to provide humanitarian aid to the local Kurdish population displaced by ongoing violence in Iraq.

Australia also contributed to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM monitored and verified Iraq's compliance with UN directives to destroy its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capability.

The maritime blockade continued after the ceasefire because Iraq was considered not to have complied with all the terms set out by the UNSC.

The RAN continued to contribute to the MIF, deploying a single ship at a time under Operation Damask, although there were periods when no Australian warships were involved.

Australia's last Operation Damask deployment occurred in 2001.

The Gulf War marked the start of many years of Australian service in and around Iraq and across what became known as the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). It also built on Australians’ contributions to peace operations in the region, such as:

• UNSTO in the Middle East since 1956
• UNEF II in Sinai from 1973 to 1979
• UNIIMOG in Iraq from 1988 to 1990
• MTO in the Sinai from 1982.

Gulf War veterans

Members from all 3 services were deployed to the Gulf War. They faced real and potential threats, particularly as Iraq continued to threaten that it would use biological and chemical weapons if necessary. Fortunately, this did not occur.

The war left its mark on Australian defence policy, public attitudes and Gulf War veterans and their families. As a significant marker, the Gulf War showed Australia’s willingness to contribute to a war aimed at maintaining the international world order.

The impact of the war on Australia’s Gulf War veterans is complicated.

Australia had no combat deaths, but many veterans were exposed to multiple toxins during their service in the Gulf region. Some Gulf War veterans reported ongoing health problems. Gulf War syndrome – or chronic multisymptom illness – has been debated, and recognition and research have been slow.

Some Gulf War veterans felt left out or less recognised than those from other wars. The lack of casualties made it perhaps too easy to dismiss their experiences. In truth, the ADF personnel performed with the professionalism and dedication expected of them during a challenging operation in a threat environment.

Experiences of RAN crews and their families

When Captain Sloper later recalled commanding Success during the First Gulf War, he was quick to admit that his running of the ship was not always ‘by the book’. He said that helped maintain the crew’s morale.

I was interviewed by Bob Hawke as we came back into Australia and he said ‘Graham, you didn’t always follow the rules up in the Gulf.’ To which my answer was, ‘Prime Minister, I never broke a rule … but you’ve got to realise rules are there for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools’. And he said, ‘I like that – can I use it?’ … an example – in the ships you were allowed to give a beer issue; two cans of beer per man per day. I was advised by a Captain of mine many many years ago ‘give a beer issue whenever you can, keep them happy’ My rules were we’d have a beer issue every night but not before you’d finished operations … My guys would say ‘we have a beer issue every night’ – and conveniently didn’t say that few took it – but it’s little things like that which make a difference, doing unorthodox things – if I was on my own I’d stop the ship and we’d have ‘Hands to Swimming’ – kick them all over the side and let them cool off, have a break … throw a couple of water polo balls in for them – it worked, made them a more cohesive team.

[Graham Sloper, quoted in Pittwater Online News, Issue 37, November 2013.]

The challenges of active service extended to the crews' families. Captain Sloper’s wife recalled the turbulent time during the Gulf War:

Graham was a good letter writer. He would share what was going on in his head when he was at sea through his letters – they were beautiful, very informative, very caring … he did share some of the dangerous and difficult things when he was at the Gulf War. I would get phone calls from some of the wives and mothers of those in his ship’s company who were watching reports on television and was able to read passages from his letters that gave them more up to date information that would allow them to know they were alright. In those early days, when the children were small, there was no support for the families at all. Thankfully that has changed now. When Graham was away I’d help look after the families of those on his ship … They needed comfort, they needed explanations.

[Dannie Sloper, quoted in Pittwater Online News, Issue 37, November 2013.]

Commemoration

The Gulf War is a conflict in which Australia made an important contribution and was fortunate not to record any deaths. Those who served in the Gulf War continued the Anzac tradition of service, and, in many ways, they set the example for those who would deploy to new conflicts 10 years later.

There is no dedicated national day of commemoration for Gulf War service. Veterans are commemorated in national observances every:

• Anzac Day
• Remembrance Day.

The contributions of Australia's veterans of the First Gulf War are recognised nationally. Over 100 memorials around Australia mention either the Gulf War or Iraq in the Places of Pride register.

In 2016, to mark the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait, the Royal Australian Mint created a Gulf War 50-cent coin to honour Australian veterans of both the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the Operation Catalyst contribution to the Iraq War in 2003–2009.

Recognition of service

Veterans of the Gulf War receive and wear the service medals for which they are eligible from their wartime or post-war service in the region.

Historical records

Australian service in the Gulf War is included in Australia’s Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations. The Gulf War is discussed in Volume 2, Australia and the New World Order, written by the official historian, Professor David Horner, and published in 2011.

The Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection holds material relating to Australia’s Gulf War deployments, including:

• artworks
• photographs
• official records
• oral histories
• ships’ logs
• unit records.

The AWM’s galleries also include an exhibition and relics relating to Australian service in the First Gulf War.

The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) has created a Preliminary Gulf War Nominal Roll.

Veteran wellbeing

DVA has commemorated Gulf War veterans through research, documentation and acknowledgement of long-term impacts.

Studies in 2003 and 2015 assessed Gulf War veterans’ health and wellbeing many years after deployment. This research has helped shape how the Australian Government recognises the war’s legacy and cares for veterans and their families.