On 16 June 1948, the Federation of Malaya (FoM) declared a state of emergency in response to rising violence from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). This action was sparked by the murders of British staff on 2 plantations. The MCP wanted Malaya to be independent and a communist state. The MCP was largely but not exclusively ethnically Chinese and held a communist ideology. The MCP formed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) in February 1949 to step up the armed insurgency that was underway.
Malayan Communist Party
The guerrillas who fought against the British Commonwealth forces during the Malayan Emergency were mostly members of the MCP.
The MCP was closely related to the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) of World War II. The commander of the MPAJA, Lai Tek, was also the Secretary-General of the MCP. Lai Tek’s hopes of seizing power in Malaya after the war were thwarted by the sudden surrender of the Japanese and the arrival of British and Indian troops.
Although the MPAJA was officially disbanded by the British, many of its members went underground. The members retained their uniforms and weapons and were ready to emerge as the military wing of the MCP.
In the meantime, the MCP began to take control of Malaya’s trade unions. Members of the MCP instigated strikes and disturbances that would prepare the way for an overthrow of the British.
However, the MCP was shaken in 1947 when Lai Tek absconded with the party funds.
In 1948, the new Secretary-General, Chin Peng, oversaw a change of direction in the MCP’s anti-British activities. Chin wanted to turn what had been a largely political struggle into a guerrilla war.
Chin reorganised the former members of the MPAJA into a 12,000-strong rural guerrilla force called the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).
Chin’s strategy was to drive representatives of the administration and other Europeans from plantations, mines and the countryside to create ‘liberated areas’ that would expand and join together. Larger villages and towns would then be taken by force. Finally, a ‘general offensive’ against the British would lead to the capture of the main cities and the setting up of a communist republic.
The strategy was not successful. Extensive guerrilla operations not only failed to lead to the establishment of any ‘liberated areas,’ but also resulted in the MRLA being forced onto the defensive.
In 1951, Chin released an ‘October Manifesto’ from his jungle headquarters in Pahang. The manifesto acknowledged that the guerrilla campaign was not working. It urged that the struggle should go back to being an essentially political one. But it was too late. For the remainder of the 1950s, the MRLA’s main concern was with survival because it was being driven into more remote areas by British Commonwealth forces.
Chin’s October Manifesto acknowledged that the MCP had not won over the Malayan proletariat (working-class people). Guerrilla intimidation and violence had alienated the populace. This inability to win over the majority of the Malay people was the underlying reason for the failure of the communist cause in the Malayan Emergency. The ethnic and cultural make-up of Malaya meant that most people were unlikely to support the guerrillas, and that Chin Peng could not credibly present himself as a nationalist leader in the manner of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. Yet he had attempted to do so. And he had embarked on a guerrilla war that he had little chance of winning.
Chin Peng
During World War II, Chin Peng, a young Chinese Malayan, fought with the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army. For his contribution to the British war effort during this period of service, Chin was awarded an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE). One British intelligence officer called him ‘Britain’s most trusted guerrilla representative’.
Nevertheless, Chin Peng was always fighting for his people and his own beliefs. During World War II, the British were his natural allies.
Chin became Secretary-General of the MCP in 1947. By 1948, he was an enemy of the British in Malaya. He led the guerrilla forces during the emergency.
Chin’s position was difficult.
It is unlikely that the communist cause would have succeeded by purely political means. And Chin’s decision to embark on a guerrilla war against the British backfired because the broader Malay population did not support the insurgents.
Without any support from the wider communist world, the MCP was limited to using small arms and poor communications. Many of its weapons were from World War II. Its armed members never exceeded more than a few thousand. And without a dedicated radio system to ensure the quick transmission of messages, the communist attempt to defeat the authorities using military means seemed, with the benefit of hindsight, doomed to fail.
On one occasion, his having resorted to guerrilla warfare almost cost Chin his life. During November 1953, 3 of Chin’s bodyguards were killed and another 3 wounded when Lincoln bombers from No. 1 Squadron RAAF bombed his jungle camp.
After the Malayan Emergency, Chin took refuge in China and continued to work for the creation of a communist Malayan state. Ultimately, however, time and economic development overtook Chin’s dream. For 20 years following the end of the Malayan Emergency, sporadic violent episodes reminded people of the insurgency.
Finally, in 1989, the MCP leadership, under Chin Peng, signed peace accords that enabled the remaining, aging guerrillas to live in resettlement villages in southern Thailand.
British Commonwealth forces
During the Malayan Emergency, Australians cooperated with British forces, locally raised units and military personnel from various British Commonwealth countries.
New Zealand’s involvement in Malaya followed a similar pattern to Australia’s. After requests from the United Kingdom, New Zealand sent a flight of 3 Dakota transport aircraft to Malaya in September 1949. The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) contributed further transport units and, in the late 1950s, squadrons of Venom fighter jets and Canberra bombers to the Commonwealth forces in Malaya.
New Zealand did not have a standing army in the early 1950s. However, it did provide the officers for the Fiji Infantry Regiment, which served in Malaya from 1952 to 1956. From 1957, a New Zealand infantry battalion was part of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Malaya. New Zealand SAS personnel also took part in the Malayan Emergency.
Royal New Zealand Navy vessels operated in Malaysian waters as part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) during the Malayan Emergency.
British Army troops were the mainstay of the Commonwealth forces in Malaya. British infantry regiments, mechanised units, a Commando brigade, an SAS regiment, the Royal Artillery Regiment and a Ghurkha infantry brigade all served in Malaya.
The indigenous Iban people of Borneo had an ambivalent relationship with the British. Some, especially those in eastern Borneo, were willing to help Commonwealth soldiers. Iban trackers from Borneo were involved on the Malayan mainland during the emergency. An Iban working with the Australians was wounded in the pipeline ambush.
Templer of Malaya
General Gerald Templer was the British High Commissioner of Malaya from January 1952 to May 1954. He also served as Director of Operations at the same time. British prime minister Winston Churchill said that Templer had ‘full power’ in Malaya. Australian Official Historian of the Malayan Emergency, Professor Peter Edwards, went further. He called Templer:
[a] dictator, who combined military power and civil control to implement a clear political goal – independence for Malaya.
Some feared that Templer might be a repressive choice. Also, fearing that he might impede Malaya’s progress to self-government. However, Templer made his feelings on the matter clear very early on. He thought the Malayan Emergency made progress towards self-government even more necessary.
Templer used his position to bring new energy to the Commonwealth effort in Malaya. Forthright and blunt, he had detractors among his subordinates. Some of them felt that he ‘pushed rather than led.’ Templer went on a tour of the country in an armoured car. He bombarded officials, military and civilian, with questions demanding quick and accurate answers.
Templer’s methods could be brutal.
The case of Tanjong Malim, north of Kuala Lumpur, was an early version of Templer’s strategy. An example of these methods involved the people of Tanjong Malim to the north of Kuala Lumpur. When they failed to assist the authorities after a communist attack, Templer rushed to the scene. He berated the locals, who soon cooperated after he imposed:
- a strict curfew
- cuts in rations
- closures of schools and bus services.
While he often used harsh measures, he also promised security and growing prosperity. This was successful in convincing much of Malaya’s population to support the government. It was particularly aimed at the ethnically Chinese population.
Templer’s success in combating communism was well regarded in Britain and widely reported:
- The Economist described Templer as deserving of the ‘highest credit’
- London Evening News reported on Templer’s ‘staunch service’
- colonial secretary Oliver Littleton described Templer as an ‘absolute ace’ for his role in Malaya.
By 1952, some leaders of the MCP already felt that the guerrilla strategy was failing. Even so, Templer’s energetic and stubborn approach to defeating the insurgency ensured that they would fail. Western histories give Templer much of the credit for the defeat of the guerrillas.
