Australians and the Battle of the Coral Sea 1942

Control of Port Moresby

In early 1942, the Japanese were continuing their offensive in the Pacific region. In January, they invaded Rabaul on the island of New Britain in New Guinea. By 15 February, they had invaded and occupied Malaya and Singapore. On 19 February, they bombed Darwin, Australia for the first time.

The threat to Australia at this time was very real.

The first stage of Japan's plan was to capture Port Moresby and the southern Solomon Islands, including Tulagi. Future stages were to attack Fiji, New Caledonia and Samoa.

Japan knew that Port Moresby would be a useful operational base in the region. From Port Moresby and Tulagi, Japanese forces could hinder shipping routes between the US and Australia. So in January 1942, they decided to invade Port Moresby by sea.

Port Moresby was the largest settlement in the Territory of New Guinea, a Mandate of Australia since 1920. Port Moresby was the main Allied base in New Guinea, so its loss would have been devastating. Without this port, Allied operations in the area would become more difficult.

The desire for control of Port Moresby led to a series of battles leading up to the Battle of the Coral Sea, and after, in the New Guinea Campaign.

Map of Imperial Japanese advances

Before the battle

The struggle for control of Port Moresby and the Pacific region continued through early 1942.

In each engagement, the Allies and the Japanese learnt more about their opponent's strength and tactics. Military advantage shifted back and forth between them throughout these battles.

Battle of Rabaul from 23 January to February 1942

Japanese forces captured Rabaul. The Australian Lark Force of around 1,400 men at Rabaul was vastly outnumbered and overpowered. Many of the troops of Lark Force, and many civilians, became prisoners of war (POWs).

The Japanese established a major military base at Rabaul. From this, they planned to launch land invasions of mainland New Guinea and support a naval invasion of Port Moresby.

Allied attacks on Rabaul from 18 to 20 February

On 18 February, a Japanese aircraft spotted the USS Lexington (aircraft carrier) leading a destroyer and cruiser force towards Rabaul.

The next day, Japanese bombers from Rabaul attacked Lexington and other ships. The bombers were met by US fighters launched from Lexington. The Japanese lost 16 planes. Losing the element of surprise, US naval forces withdrew.

The Allies then carried out heavy bombing raids on Rabaul. These attacks pushed the Japanese to postpone their attack on Salamaua and Lae to early March 1942.

Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942

The naval strike force of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command intercepted a Japanese invasion convoy in the Java Sea. ABDA's 14-ship force included an RAN heavy cruiser, HMAS Perth.

ABDA intercepted and attacked the Japanese escort force. It was a disastrous defeat for the Allies, with the loss of many ships.

Perth survived the battle, but only for one day.

Battle of the Sunda Strait on 28 February 1942

As USS Houston and HMAS Perth were retreating from the Battle of the Java Sea, they encountered another Japanese convoy. The Japanese attacked, and both ships sank on 28 February.

Australian survivors of Perth became POWs.

Japanese invasion of Salamaua and Lae from 8 to 13 March 1942

The villages of Salamaua and Lae in New Guinea were strategically important to the Japanese. Both had airstrips and could provide military bases for an amphibious invasion of Port Moresby. Landing soldiers by sea would avoid having to approach Port Morseby over the steep Owen Stanley Range. Along the Kokoda Track.

On 8 March 1942, Japanese forces landed at Lae and then Salamaua. Before withdrawing into the jungle, the Australian troops stationed there demolished the airfields and facilities.

RAAF Hudson bombers harassed the invading Japanese forces. The attacks caused damage, but didn't stop the landings.

Under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Yorktown led a cruiser and destroyer force. The force included HMAS Australia. Receiving intelligence of the landings, Brown's force was diverted to the Gulf of Papua to attack the Japanese.

On the opposite coast to Lae and Salamaua, and with the Owen Stanley Range between, the Allied naval force was well screened from Japanese observation.

Early on 10 March 1942, 52 bomber and fighter aircraft launched from each of the US carriers. The ships' aircraft attacked the Japanese naval ships and the landed troops.

Flying over the Owen Stanley Range was potentially treacherous. Experienced Australian civilian pilots gave guidance to the US pilots. The US air groups from the carriers were joined by US bombers and RAAF aircraft based in Townsville, Queensland.

The US fighters strafed landing sites and ground forces. US bombers attacked Japanese ships with heavy bombs and torpedos. Four Japanese ships were sunk and 7 damaged.

It was the largest Japanese loss of ships and men in a single action since the beginning of the war. Of the US aircraft, 103 of 104 aircraft launched returned to their home aircraft carriers safely.

The Allied attack was pivotal. The loss of so many ships meant that the Japanese had to postpone their planned attacks on Port Moresby and Tulagi.

Japanese command also realised that its landing forces needed aircraft carrier support. This tactical change determined the next battle.

During the battle

Japanese invasion plans

The Japanese plan was to invade Tulagi on 3 or 4 May 1942 and then Port Moresby.

The seaborne invasion force would be supported by a covering group of the light aircraft carrier, Shoho, with heavy cruisers and a destroyer. A cover force of lighter ships, gunboats, light cruisers and support ships would establish a seaplane base on Santa Isabel Island, Solomon Islands.

When Tulagi was secured, these 2 naval forces would protect the Port Moresby invasion group.

The aircraft carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, heavy cruisers and destroyers would form a strike force in the Coral Sea. This would give air cover to the invasion force and allow air attacks on Allied forces at Port Moresby. The force would also intercept and attack any Allied forces in the Coral Sea if the invasion convoy was threatened.

Allied forces

The Allies were able to decode most Japanese naval signals by April 1942. Decoded signals had led US naval commanders to think an invasion through the Coral Sea was planned for May. They knew Port Moresby was the most likely target.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the US Naval Intelligence Service jointly ran the Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). The unit provided critical intelligence in this battle and throughout the New Guinea and Pacific campaigns.

The Australian network of coastwatchers also provided continual information on Japanese air and sea movements across the Pacific throughout the war.

Based on this sound intelligence, Allied naval command decided to send all available aircraft carrier forces to the Coral Sea on 29 April 1942.

Allied forces were centred on the 2 aircraft carriers, USS Yorktown and USS Lexington, in 2 naval task forces:

• Task Force 17 (TF 17) with Yorktown, heavy cruisers and destroyers was already in the Coral Sea
• Task Force 11 (TF 11) with Lexington, destroyers and cruisers was quickly deployed to the Coral Sea.

At the time, Rear Admiral Crace was commanding an Allied cruiser and destroyer force called Task Force 44 (TF 44). The force included the RAN heavy cruisers, HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart, with US ships. On 6 May 1942, during the battle, TF 44 became TF 17.3.

The aim of TF 17.3 was to patrol the Jomard Passage and intercept the Japanese landing force. Japan's transport ships in the landing force would be lightly defended and and open to attack.

Roy Scrivener, a seaman aboard HMAS Hobart, recalled the moment his ship joined the large Allied fleet.

The captain is about to address the ship's company. Everyone stops talking; everyone listens. Japanese have been sighted coming down to the area south of New Guinea. They have occupied Tulagi. Aircraft from an American aircraft carrier have attacked Tulagi and sunk a number of vessels and put out of action a number of aircraft. We will be joining a United States Navy Fleet to intercept, if necessary, the Japanese force. Okay, off we went and within a day or two, we rendezvous with the most magnificent sight I had ever seen ... There were two aircraft carriers, there were battle ships, there were cruisers, there were destroyers and trailing astern and a little separated, were the tankers with their destroyer escorts … what a sight! And what a wonderful feeling I had until I realised, my God, they're not here to play games. We're all here for fair dinkum trouble!

[Roy Scrivener, February 1989 interview, Keith Murdoch Sound Archive, AWM]

AWM 110231

First actions at Tulagi

In the path of the Japanese force was the Australian Advanced Operating Base at Tulagi. Australian Army commandos of 2/1st Independent Company operated the base. Also at Tulagi were No 11 Squadron RAAF and No 20 Squadron RAAF, operating Catalina flying boats and a few Hudson bombers.

From 1 May 1942, the Japanese heavily bombed the Australian base at Tulagi. No 11 Squadron kept operating until the Japanese were fewer than 35 miles from the island.

On 2 May, the Tulagi base was evacuated. No 11 and 20 Squadrons continued to fly reconnaissance missions supplying intelligence to Allied forces as they withdrew.

Throughout the battle and up to 10 May 1942, RAAF aircraft continued to fly reconnaissance, supply information and attack Japanese aircraft and submarines where possible.

On 3 May, the Japanese landed on Tulagi.

The next day, with information from RAAF reconnaissance and Australian coastwatchers, the carrier USS Yorktown launched an aircraft attack. The aircraft damaged and destroyed several aircraft and destroyed most of the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft on Tulagi. The loss of aircraft severely limited the Japanese force's ability to track Allied ships during the battle.

On 4 May, about 190 km south of Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands), TF 17, with the carrier Yorktown, had launched 60 aircraft in 3 strikes against Japanese forces off Tulagi.

Allied aircraft sank the Japanese destroyer Kikuzuki and 3 minesweepers, and damaged 4 other ships. The US lost one torpedo bomber and 2 fighters but suffered no casualties.

Carrier battle first day on 7 May 1942

Early on 7 May, Crace's TF 17.3 was detached from the main Allied force to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet at Jomard Passage.

A US reconnaissance plane spotted the Japanese light carrier Shoho. Lexington and Yorktown launched all available aircraft to attack. Heavily bombed and torpedoed, Shoho sank.

At around the same time, a Japanese scout aircraft reported spotting the main US carrier fleet. But it was actually the US destroyer Sims and the oiler (fuel ship) Neosho. As Japanese aircraft reached the ships to attack, Vice Admiral Takagi, commander of the carrier force, realised the mistake. Heavily attacked, Sims sank and Neosho was left dead in the water.

Meanwhile, the US carrier force had moved between the Japanese invasion force and the Japanese carrier fleet.

Attack at Jomard Passage on 7 May 1942

On the afternoon of 7 May 1942, Crace's TF 17.3 in the Jomard Passage came under attack from Japanese torpedo bombers. With no air protection, Crace ordered the group into a protective diamond formation.

The Japanese launched torpedoes at the cruisers: 3 at HMAS Australia, one at HMAS Hobart and 4 at USS Chicago.

With skilful manoeuvring, the ships avoided the torpedoes. The crew moved the ships to face the incoming bombers, reducing the target area. In his post-action report, Crace wrote:

The day was calm and sunny and the sea very blue so that the tracks were very easily seen. How those torpedoes were avoided beats me … They can only have missed by a matter of feet. Farncomb [the ship's commanding officer] handled the ship extremely well and it was entirely due to him and a great deal of luck that Australia was not hit.

[Quoted in Chris Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea: the Australian commander's story, North Sydney, 1991, p 95]

After the torpedoes failed, Japanese bombers strafed the ships.

Jack Langrell, on board HMAS Australia, described the scene.

All of a sudden all hell broke loose so I quite realised then this was definitely the Japs coming in … One of the Japanese torpedo bombers would have been 100 feet from the ship's side and level with the upper deck as it passed down the port side. Unbeknown to me they were spraying the ship with machine-gun bullets.

[Quoted in Chris Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea, p 95]

In the attack, 6 Australians and 3 US naval personnel were injured. Two of the US men later died from their wounds. Five Japanese bombers were destroyed but the Allied ships were undamaged.

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Carrier battle second day on 8 May 1942

On the morning of 8 May, both fleets were spotted by their enemy.

The Allies and the Japanese launched simultaneous aircraft attacks from their carriers. Both forces launched dive bombers, torpedo planes and fighters in waves of attack.

Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki from the Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku described how it felt to attack the US aircraft carriers.

When we attacked the enemy carriers we ran into a virtual wall of anti-aircraft fire; the carriers and their supporting ships blackened the sky with exploding shells and tracers. It seemed impossible that we could survive our bombing and torpedo runs through such incredible defences ...

[Quoted in Chris Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea, p 119]

USS Lexington was severely damaged and caught fire, and 216 men were killed in action. After evacuating the surviving crew, the ship was scuttled that afternoon.

Captain Frederick Sherman, Lexington's commanding officer, described the evacuation.

Simultaneously, ammunition stores started to explode and the blaze spread to the hanger deck. All this time the engineering crew below deck had stuck to their post, although the intense heat was blistering the paint of the bulkheads around them. The rapidly-spreading fire, however, finally necessitated an order to the engineering men to come up on deck. Even as they came topside telephone communications failed. Had we delayed the order one minute none would have reached the top alive. As communications were destroyed and the steering gear was gone, there was no chance of extinguishing the fire and Rear-Admiral Fitch … decided to abandon ship. I gave the order at 5.07 pm.

[Quoted in Chris Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea, p 95]

The American carrier USS Yorktown and the Japanese carrier Shokaku were severely damaged.

With the invasion force now vulnerable, General Inoue ordered Japanese forces to break off the engagement. The invasion of Port Moresby was postponed.

With the loss of one carrier and another damaged, TF 17 withdrew from the Coral Sea. Out of contact with the main force, Crace later concluded that TF 17 had left and he sailed for Australia.

The damaged USS Yorktown was repaired at Pearl Harbor. The ship later took part in the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

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Aftermath

The battle was a tactical victory for Japanese forces but a strategic victory for the Allies.

The Allied actions in the Coral Sea prevented the Japanese from invading Port Moresby by sea. It was the first time that a Japanese seaborne invasion had been stopped.

For the Japanese, the defeat was a temporary setback. They didn't abandon their sea invasion plans until after the Battle of Midway. Only then did they try to capture Port Moresby by land via the Kokoda Track. A far more difficult campaign.

The Japanese navy had lost around three-quarters of its carrier aircraft, a light carrier and a destroyer. The US had lost around half of its carrier aircraft, a carrier, a destroyer and an oiler.

Two Australians were wounded during the naval battle, but none were killed. Two Australian Catalina flying boats and their crews were lost in operations from Tulagi on 4 May and 6 May 1942.

Some 550 US personnel and more than 1,000 Japanese were killed or wounded in the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Captain Harold Bruce Farncomb was commanding HMAS Australia during the battle. Originally from Sydney, he'd been in the Navy since joining the Royal Australian Naval College in 1913. On Harold's confidential personal record in June 1942, a month after the battle, Rear Admiral Crace wrote:

A very capable Captain who handles his ship admirably. A firm but just disciplinarian. Has a quick clever brain and possesses a wide knowledge of affairs. Is well read and speaks both French and German reasonably well and has travelled in these countries.

NAA: A8139, L851

Commemoration of those who served

The Battle of the Coral Sea is the largest naval battle that has been fought near Australia. Australian and US personnel who served in this crucial battle ensured that the Japanese would not launch a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby.

Australians who served in the Battle of the Coral Sea are commemorated on 5 May every year.

Many plaques, monuments and places around Australia commemorate Australian and Allied veterans of the battle, including:

• Battle of the Coral Sea and Rear Admiral Sir John Crace Memorial in Crace, Australian Capital Territory
• Battle of the Coral Sea Memorial Park on Coral Sea Drive in Cardwell, Queensland
• Coral Sea Memorial Swimming Pool in Townsville, Queensland
• Coral Sea Park in Maroubra, New South Wales
• stained-glass windows in St Mark's Chapel at HMAS Cerberus, Victoria.

Engage more with this topic

Oral histories

The Australians at War Film Archive has 35 interviews with RAN veterans who mention the Battle of the Coral Sea. Listen to their stories.

Podcast

This episode of the podcast Paths to Victory explores some stories of those who served in the Pacific theatre. Includes a recount from Roy Scrivener on HMAS Hobart. Listen to the podcast.

What people were reading

Australians read about a 'terrific' battle in newspapers back home.

CORAL SEA BATTLE MAY DECIDE THE FATE OF AUSTRALIA (1942) newsclip