The 1968 Tet Offensive was a decisive turning point in the Vietnam War. Despite suffering military losses, the North Vietnamese successfully undermined allied resolve and shifted global public opinion. Australian Army units effectively secured Ba Ria and Long Dien, demonstrating proficiency in intense urban combat.
The Tet Offensive, launched in early 1968 by the Vietcong, marked a significant escalation in the scale and the intensity of the Vietnam War. Although it was defeated in a strict military sense, the Tet Offensive shook the resolve of the Americans and their allies in Vietnam, and fuelled anti-war sentiment in America and the rest of the world.
In 1967, factions within the Vietcong and North Vietnamese leadership began to call for a change of direction in the war's conduct.
General Vo Nguyen Giap, who had formerly advocated waging a largely guerrilla war, came to believe a 'quick victory' might now be possible. Planning therefore began for a major offensive in South Vietnam that would provoke a 'general uprising' against the corrupt and unpopular South Vietnamese government.
Abandoning conventional military wisdom, Vietcong forces were not heavily concentrated for the offensive. Instead, the aim of the North Vietnamese offensive was to mount as many different attacks in as many locations as possible. In a departure from traditional guerrilla tactics, the main targets were in population centres rather than the countryside.
The offensive in which more than 100 towns and cities were attacked started during the early hours of 31 January 1968.
The first assaults achieved almost complete surprise, not least because they occurred during the Chinese New Year, or Tet, holiday period. According to recent tradition, Tet was a time of truce.
In many places, the Vietcong were astonishingly successful. In the former capital, Hue, they took control of a large part of the city. The most spectacular Vietcong successes were, however, in the South Vietnamese capital Saigon, where a number of government buildings were attacked. An elite Vietcong squad even managed to fight its way into the grounds of the US embassy.
Although most of the attacks were quickly defeated, in Hue and at the American provincial base at Khe Sanh, Tet signalled the beginning of protracted battles. Yet there was no 'general uprising' in South Vietnam.
The 'quick victory' had turned into a disastrous defeat. Recriminations within the communist leadership soon followed. With the Vietcong decimated, General Giap lost much of his authority, ultimately being retained merely in the figurehead role of Minister of Defence. Only much later would the Vietcong and North Vietnamese realise what they had actually achieved.
The Tet Offensive shocked the Americans and their allies, especially because it occurred at a time when they thought they were winning the war.
Graphic footage of fighting in Saigon and Hue was broadcast into American households and around the world. The bitterness and desperation conveyed in these images deeply affected many people – even those who had until then broadly supported US involvement in South Vietnam.
The initial Vietcong successes, the ferocity of the fighting and heavy South Vietnamese and US casualties ultimately left a far greater impression on worldwide public opinion than the offensive's final defeat.
After the Tet Offensive, US politicians and military leaders doubted whether a military victory would be possible. They started thinking of other ways to end the conflict. In this sense, Tet marks the turning point in the Vietnam War.
But perhaps the Tet Offensive's most enduring significance lay in how widely it revealed the horrors of the Vietnam War, and war in general.
Australian soldiers of the 7th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, wear American helmets and flak jackets as they stand guard outside the Hotel Canberra in Saigon during the Tet Offensive. The building was fortified and guarded because the Viet Cong specifically targeted urban establishments used by the Americans and their allies. [AWM P01539.001]
Battle of Ba Ria
In his history of 3RAR's 1967-68 tour of Vietnam, Major R. F. Stuart described Ba Ria, located between Nui Dat and Vung Tau, as a 'sleepy town, where Australian soldiers could buy various 'knick-knacks' and have their jungle greens laundered under local contract.
At the beginning of February 1968, that was about to change.
As people across Vietnam looked forward to the Tet holiday and relaxed in the expectation of a cease-fire bringing a few days of respite from the country's long war, Vietcong forces from outside Phuoc Tuy began concentrating in the province. On the holiday eve, they began moving towards their objectives, Bar Ra and nearby Long Dien.
At the same time, local Vietcong prepared to attack other provincial targets.
At 5 am on 1 February 1968, heavily armed members of the Vietcong's D445 Provincial Battalion started entering Ba Ria, quickly occupying the main buildings. By dawn, the National Liberation Front flag was flying over the town and key installations had either been neutralised or isolated.
While the opening of the Vietcong's assault seemed to promise success, the guerrillas lacked the local knowledge to be sure of the strength and location of the town's defences. Nor did they receive any support from Ba Ria's inhabitants even though one of the Tet Offensive's key aims was to foment rebellion among South Vietnam's civilian population.
But the Vietcong's speedy occupation of Phuoc Tuy's main centre, along with their other attacks across the province, gave lie to the growing belief that the Vietcong were all but beaten in the Australian area of operations.
The Australians, like allied forces all over South Vietnam, were surprised by the ferocity and widespread nature of the communist attacks, but responded quickly to the threat.
3RAR's A Company boarded A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment's armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and left Nui Dat for Ba Ria. As they approached the town, a little over 3 hours after the Vietcong began their assault, the Australians came under small arms fire.
As the infantry left the APCs and advanced towards the village, explosions from rocket-propelled grenades mingled with rifle and machine-gun bullets.
Before they left Australia, 3RAR underwent intensive jungle warfare training, but at Ba Ria they found themselves in a built-up urban environment. An unusual circumstance for Australian troops in South Vietnam.
Over the next 24 hours, the infantrymen, with the support of the APC crews and US Phantom jets, engaged in a difficult, deadly fight. They were moving from house to house and street to street, slowly driving the Vietcong from their well-prepared strongholds.
The battle went on for 24 hours.
One helicopter pilot braved heavy fire 3 times to retrieve seriously injured men from the town square. As well as providing heavy, accurate machine-gun fire, the APCs also evacuated the wounded.
At one stage, 2 Platoon rescued 3 US military advisors who were in Ba Ria when the Vietcong arrived. Two other Americans and an Australian military advisor were less fortunate when they, along with 3RAR's 2 Platoon, tried to rescue another American. They were killed, and the carrier troop commander and an Australian soldier were wounded.
When another 2 carriers were hit by rocket-propelled grenades, 2 Platoon was isolated. Only after a failed attempt by South Vietnamese forces, an airstrike and the appearance of 3 Platoon were they rescued.
By the time B Company arrived in Ba Ria on the afternoon of 2 February, the fight was all but over.
Some Vietcong had fled the town during the night. Others were killed or had withdrawn after a series of airstrikes and further pressure from 3RAR.
The battle resulted in 19 Australians being wounded, the deaths of 40 enemy and the wounding of at least 14 more.
On 7 February, 3RAR returned to Ba Ria in response to further Vietcong raids on the town. D Company was sent to secure the western approaches where they spent an incident-free night in defensive positions.
The next morning, the Australians moved to help Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops clear the Vietcong from nearby Long Dien.
After seeing a South Vietnamese battalion withdraw under fire, some of them in panic, B Company experienced sporadic contacts and were subject to sniper fire but held their position.
Just as worrying as the Vietcong was the too-close-for-comfort artillery fire called in by the South Vietnamese.
While neighbouring platoons weathered the Vietcong's intermittent fire, 5 Platoon experienced a violent contact when they were ordered to rescue a South Vietnamese officer and a US military adviser who had become separated from their unit during its withdrawal earlier in the day. After 4 Platoon joined the assault, the situation stabilised, but the Vietnamese officer had already been killed, as had 3 of the Australians.
Long Dien
As the fight for Ba Ria was developing, other Vietcong troops were moving on nearby Long Dien, about 5 km to the east.
3RAR's D Company was sent to the village, arriving in APCs on the afternoon of 3 February.
South Vietnamese troops had been fighting the Vietcong since the attacks began, and an Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion had been forced to withdraw under heavy fire.
The Australians arrived to a series of what the official historian called 'minor contacts', but which the battalion history described as 'heavy sniper fire' as they moved through the village towards the marketplace.
By the next morning, with the marketplace secured, the Australians continued to come under heavy fire.
12 Platoon was engaged in a sharp encounter at the village sawmill but managed to overcome resistance when 11 Platoon joined the fight.
Later in the day, 11 Platoon suffered 3RAR's first combat death in South Vietnam. The troops were sent to clear the remaining pockets of enemy resistance.
After an hour of heavy fighting, as darkness fell, they were forced to withdraw and take up defensive positions for the night.
The next day brought isolated contacts, but the worst of the fighting in Long Dien was over, and D Company returned to Nui Dat on the afternoon of 6 February.
Other task force actions
At the end of January 1968, intelligence reports weer suggesting the likelihood of an assault on Saigon during the Tet festivities. So, 2RAR and 7RAR, as part of Operation Coburg, were deployed along the Vietcong's main approach to Saigon to block enemy troops moving back after their attack.
On the night of 31 January, the Australians learned that the village of Trang Bom, 1.5 km from their positions, had been overrun by waves of Vietcong.
The next afternoon, 2RARA drove them out.
The following day, the Vietcong reclaimed the village, and the Australians forced the enemy's retreat after bitter house-to-house fighting.
When 7RAR's D Company went forward to search the area, one platoon came into contact with an enemy battalion and was almost destroyed. Only after being hit by artillery fire and air strikes did the Vietcong withdraw.
Medics found D Company's survivors in shock and the wounded lying in agony.
Further fighting followed for 7RAR when C Company went into an enemy bunker complex that even an accurate napalm strike could not destroy. After 7 hours of intense combat, the Australians prevailed.
Frequent, intense contact marked this phase of the Tet Offensive for 2RAR and 7RAR as the Vietcong's survivors withdrew from Saigon, passing the Australian positions as expected. In a series of ambushes during the first week of February, the Australians killed 90 enemy and captured another 5.
On 11 February, elements of 3RAR relieved 7RAR and moved into the area of operations. 2RAR returned to the Nui Dat base on 13 February.
Ba Ria and Long Dien were the first combat experiences for many of 3RAR's soldiers. Tet was a serious test of their training under battle conditions, but because most of the fighting took place in a built-up environment with the support of armoured personnel carriers, it was unrepresentative of much that followed in 1968. As the official historian observed, it was 'an entirely new experience for any battalion at that time'.