Australian forces used aggressive patrolling to dominate Phuoc Tuy Province. However, a barrier minefield established in 1967 proved counterproductive after the Vietcong repurposed the mines against Australian troops. This tactical failure caused significant casualties and long-term trauma. It also necessitated a prolonged clearing operation.
Patrolling was the cornerstone of the 1st Australian Task Force's (ATF's) operations in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Rather than wait behind the wire for the Vietcong to launch attacks on their Task Force base, the Australians sought to control the area around Nui Dat. They hoped this would deny the Vietcong any element of surprise and make it difficult for them to move undetected.
The idea behind Australian operations in Phuoc Tuy was to drive the Vietcong from their jungle sanctuaries and camps and to remove them from areas where they could exert influence over the local people. The Australian tactics surprised the Vietcong, who were used to meeting a South Vietnamese enemy that fought from defensive positions and rarely pursued them into the jungle.
Patrolling was so central to the Australian conduct of the war in Phuoc Tuy that newly arrived battalions were often sent out on familiarisation operations, usually into areas considered relatively free of enemy activity. Over the course of several days, they would hone their patrolling skills, gain experience in calling in air and artillery support, and see how these weapons could be used to complement counter-insurgency operations.
Australian patrols covered a range of terrains and conditions.
Much of the countryside was heavily vegetated, but thousands of hectares were also covered in rubber plantations – dark, dangerous areas of evenly spaced trees that offered a hidden enemy clear fields of fire.
Rice paddies posed different problems. Crossing these open fields, where men could be exposed to enemy fire many metres from cover, was a nerve-wracking experience.
The weather also made patrolling difficult. In the dry season, the men endured intense tropical heat. In the monsoon (wet season), they patrolled in constant rain and were rarely dry.
A minefield
In early 1967, Brigadier Stuart Graham, the new Australian Task Force Commander, drew up plans for a barrier minefield that he believed would sever a vital Vietcong supply route, preventing their movement from their mountain bases to the rice-growing areas in the west and protecting local villagers from communist influence.
The proposed minefield would contain approximately 20,000 'jumping jack' mines between 2 wire fences for a length of 10 km, from the Horseshoe near Dat Do to the coast. Sappers of the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) would lay the mines, fitted with anti-lift devices. Then the completed minefield would be guarded by Task Force and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops.
On 25 May 1967, the 1 Field Squadron Operations Log reported:
Mines laid today 1348. Total mines with anti-lift 2088. Total mines without anti lift 1148. Grand total 3236.
[AWM 95 Item 1 Field Squadron RAE Ops Log, May 1-31, 1967]
There were a number of injuries and deaths during the mine-laying operation, and casualties continued after its completion.
The minefield's security was ineffective. The Vietcong breached the barrier fences, lifted the mines and re-used them against the Australian and ARVN troops.
They were very clever. They would set a mine, for instance an M16 mine; they were pulling them up from our minefield. Pulling a pin out of a grenade and sitting down, under the ground, and sitting the mine on top, the M16 to keep the grenade loaded and fill it in. When we'd come along we'd see the mine and unscrew the mine. Make it safe at the top; unscrew the detonating device out of it. Lift the mine out and, when we did, the grenade would go off.
[Sapper Robert Earl, MID, in Michael Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, Hachette Australia, 2007, p 193; drawing on Interview No 639, Australians at War Film Archive.]
Sapper Robert Earl, 1st Field Squadron, RAE, suffered serious injuries while he was helping 5RAR troops with a 'dust off' casualty evacuation in the Long Hai hills during the night of 4 July 1969. He and the 5RAR casualties were 'casevaced' out to the Vung Tau base.
The choppers came in then to pick us up. They were still transporting out the wounded. It was an M16 jumping mine … they had put a snail on top of the three prongs, so all you would see was a snail. A snail … in daylight you wouldn't see it. In fact, I think it would encourage the blokes to walk on the snail anyway.
[Sapper Robert Earl, MID, in Michael Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, Hachette Australia, 2007, p 188; drawing on Interview No 639, Australians at War Film Archive.]
In August 1969, during Operation Esso, a 5RAR attack in the Long Hai mountains, 58 Australians were wounded and 9 killed. Most of the casualties were the result of jumping jack mines.
Details of the minefield had been kept from the Australian public, but the continuous stream of minefield casualties prompted public controversy and some difficult questions in Australian Parliament.
In 1968, Australian engineers began the dangerous task of sweeping and clearing the 'barrier minefield'.
The engineers' success was limited until late 1969 when Major Rex Rowe, the commanding officer of 1st Field Squadron, RAE and his colleagues devised a solution. Attaching large steel-plated rollers to the rear of an armoured personnel carrier (APC), they were able to trigger mines more safely. It took nearly 2 years to clear the mines from the field. By then, the Australian mines had contributed significantly to Australia's casualty rate in South Vietnam.