Battle of Guadalcanal and Australia

Situation in the Pacific

The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941. This followed Japanese attacks on US forces in Hawaii's Pearl Harbor on 7 December and British forces in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong on 8 December.

The main aims for Japanese leaders in the Asia–Pacific region were:

• occupying territories rich in natural resources like oil
• establishing defensive bases to support and defend Japan's growing empire
• eliminating the threat of the US Navy.

The first months of the Pacific War were successful for Japanese forces. By May 1942, Japan controlled:

• the Philippines
• Malaya
• the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia)
• Singapore
• Hong Kong
• Thailand
• Borneo
• Burma
• Solomon and Gilbert Islands
• Guam and Wake Island
• New Britain
• Bali, Timor, Java and Sumatra
• most islands north and east of Papua and New Guinea
• Lae and Madang on the New Guinea mainland.

Japan's weakened navy

From December 1941, Japan was committing its armed forces to 2 wars:

• Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) in Asia
• Pacific War (1941–1945).

In May 1942, in the Pacific War, Japan lost many ships during the Battle of the Coral Sea.

In June 1942, Japanese forces invaded the Aleutian Islands. They wanted to stop the US from using the islands as a base to attack mainland Japan.

In planning Japan's strategy for Midway Atoll in the North Pacific Ocean, Admiral Yamamoto had to commit naval forces to the Aleutian landings. He also committed a full aircraft carrier group to a planned attack on Port Moresby.

Japan's Aleutian landings and the Battle of Midway happened at the same time, in early June 1942. The Aleutian commitments weakened Japanese naval strength at Midway.

The US defeated the Japanese in the Battle of Midway. The Japanese lost their 4 large aircraft carriers, and around 3,000 personnel were killed.

The destroyed aircraft carriers were the core of Japanese naval power. They were impossible to replace quickly.

Naval losses made it far more difficult for the Japanese to launch seaborne invasions or defend their occupied territories. In losing naval strength, the Japanese lost their strategic advantage.

This gave the Allies an opportunity to move from defensive to offensive actions. Guadalcanal marked the start of Allied operations to push back Japanese forces and retake lost territory in the Pacific.

Allied planning

In June 1942, the Allies were building new air bases at:

• Milne Bay in Papua
• Meruake in New Guinea (now Indonesia).

These bases would allow more Allied air activity to put pressure on Japanese forces.

Around this time, Admiral Ernest King, the US Navy's chief of naval operations, proposed a new Pacific offensive to General George Marshall, the US Army's chief of staff. The plan was detailed by early July 1942.

The US aimed to capture the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Gavutu.

Guadalcanal was important because an operational Japanese air base there would threaten:

• Port Moresby in Papua
• Allied forces across Papua and New Guinea
• communications and sea routes between Australia and the US.

The new Allied offensive was codenamed Operation Watchtower. US Marines at Guadalcanal later called it ‘Operation Shoestring’ because of supply shortages.

A joint army and navy operation, Watchtower was placed under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area.

The date set for the landings was 7 August 1942.

The Allied operation involved US Navy ships, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships and US troops, including:

• an attacking force of US Navy aircraft carriers and battleships
• a US Navy screening force of destroyers
• amphibious landing forces of the US 1st Marines
• an escort force of HMA ships Australia, Canberra, Hobart and the USS Chicago
• a fire support group of US Navy cruisers and destroyers.

Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley was on loan to the Royal Australian Navy for service in the South West Pacific Area. On board HMAS Australia, Crutchley commanded the escort force. During the operation, this group bombarded the islands and protected the Allied landing ships and troops from attack.

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Invasion of Buna–Gona

On 21 July 1942, while the Allies were planning Operation Watchtower, the Japanese invaded Buna and Gona on the north coast of Papua. This was part of the Pacific War struggle for Port Moresby.

This meant that the Allies and the Japanese would be allocating combat resources to both fronts – the New Guinea and Guadalcanal campaigns. The result of one campaign would affect the other.

Allied landings

On 7 August 1942, HMAS Australia started bombarding Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. The US Navy then landed marines at Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Gavutu.

The waters around the Solomon Islands were not well charted at the time. To navigate, the Allies needed local knowledge.

Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve (RANVR) officers who knew the local waters helped to pilot the naval ships into the landings. Two RANVR officers also joined the first wave of US Marines landing on Tulagi to act as guides.

One of the RANVR officers who guided ships, Warrant Officer Innes Harper, was awarded the US Legion of Merit for his actions in the Tulagi landings.

The Allied naval ships bombed Guadalcanal heavily before the landings. But the Japanese thought the bombings were a diversion for a possible Allied raid on Buna.

Despite intercepting Allied radio messages about plans for action in the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese there were caught by surprise.

Henderson Field

The Allies' first objective on Guadalcanal was to take control of the airfield known as Henderson Field.

US Marines quickly took control of the unfinished airfield. It was not heavily defended. When the Marines landed, they found fewer troops than estimated. These were mainly construction troops and Korean prisoner labourers at the airstrip.

The Japanese fighting forces had retreated into the mountainous ridges around the airfield. It was in these sharp ridges that fighting would continue for many months.

While the Japanese forces on Tulagi and Gavatu were vastly outnumbered, they put up a strong resistance. The Japanese Commander on Tulagi, Shigetoshi Miyazaki, signalled his commander,

Enemy troop strength is overwhelming, We will defend to the last man.

On the 8 and 9, while the landed troops were fighting to secure the island and its materials and supplies were being unloaded, US naval forces were heavily attacked by air.

Worried about attacks, Admiral Fletcher withdrew his aircraft carrier force. The removal of protection from Fletcher's carriers meant that the landing ships had to stop unloading and move as well. This gave the US Marines on Guadalcanal only about 14 days of supplies and made their first days of fighting more difficult.

After capturing the airfield, the US had it operational by 18 August. It was named Henderson Field for a US naval marine pilot killed in the Battle of Midway.

Having a working airfield gave the Allies an advantage. The Japanese attacked Henderson Field many times, but the Allies held it.

In the Battle for Henderson Field from 24 to 26 October 1942, the Japanese launched repeated attacks. Withdrawing without gaining the airfield, the Japanese lost around 2,200 to 3,000 troops. The US lost around 80 troops in this battle.

The battle for Guadalcanal continued for months with many land and sea battles. Eventually, lacking resources, suffering heavy losses and fighting on other fronts, the Japanese abandoned their fight for Guadalcanal.

Coastwatchers network

The Coastwatchers network played a vital role during the Pacific War. They were able to provide immediate information on Japanese military actions and movements, often from Japanese-occupied territory. The coastwatchers and local people working with them risked their lives.

The Coastwatchers network was established and run by the Royal Australian Navy. The coastwatchers were given RANVR ranks to protect them in the event of capture.

Coastwatchers were often plantation managers or local administrators. They had excellent local knowledge and connections from having lived on the islands. Good relationships with the local indigenous peoples and troops were vital to their work.

Coastwatchers had large wireless (radio) sets to transmit with. They reported Japanese military activity and losses to Australian Naval Intelligence. Their information helped the Allies plan their actions and issue important warnings.

A British man who was the District Officer on Guadalcanal with the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force, Captain Martin Clemens, was also a coastwatcher. He had been submitting reports on Japan's progress in building Henderson Field.

Along with the Australian coastwatchers, Clemens supplied critical intelligence before and during the Guadalcanal Campaign.

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US Navy Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey, commander of the South Pacific forces on Guadalcanal, said:

The Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.

On Bougainville Island, neighbouring Guadalcanal, the RANVR coastwatchers were:

• Lieutenant Paul Mason, a former plantation owner, who had lived on Bougainville for 20 years
• Lieutenant Jack Read.

On Guadalcanal, the RANVR coastwatchers were:

• Lieutenant Donald MacFarlan
• Sub-Lieutenant Frederick 'Snow' Rhoades, a former manager of a copra and rubber plantation.

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In August 1942, Read and Mason on Bougainville were instructed to move inland and keep radio silence. This was so they would be available during the landings. They remained on the coast and continued to supply information, warning Allied forces of the Japanese approach.

Japanese forces had tried to capture the coastwatchers, including landing a force with dogs on Bougainville. But the coastwatchers managed to evade capture thanks to their local knowledge and skills, as well as the help of local villagers.

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Vital warnings

The coastwatchers played a vital role in securing the Guadalcanal landings for the Allies.

At 10:30 am on the first day, 7 August, Paul Mason at Bougainville spotted a Japanese bomber formation with fighter escort heading for Guadalcanal. Mason's message to Guadalcanal read:

twenty-four torpedo bombers headed yours.

This gave Allied ships time to disperse and arm, and for US fighter aircraft to reach sufficient altitude to intercept the Japanese planes. In this raid, there was little damage to US ships, but few of the Japanese bombers escaped.

Later that day, Mason gave a warning of Japanese dive bombers heading for Guadalcanal. His warning allowed the Allied troop transports to disperse and US fighters to be in the air to intercept.

The Japanese lost 30 of the 51 planes they launched on the first day.

The next day, Jack Read on Bougainville spotted another force of Japanese bombers heading for Guadalcanal. Read’s message to Guadalcanal gave critical warning time:

from J E R, forty bombers heading yours.

This time, the Japanese bombers avoided the US aircraft that were waiting for them.

The Japanese bombers managed to attack the Allied ships at Lunga Point near the airfield. They were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire from the transport ships and their escort. Most of the Japanese aircraft were destroyed with little damage to the Allied ships.

Bravery awards

Without the coastwatchers' warnings in the first days, Allied losses would have been much higher. This would have threatened the success of the Allied landings.

The coastwatchers continued to gather and transmit important intelligence throughout the Guadalcanal Campaign. And the Japanese continued to pursue them.

Read and Mason and their men were evacuated from Bougainville by submarine in 1943 as Japanese forces closed in on their location. Mason returned to Bougainville in 1944 and led a guerrilla campaign.

MacFarlan and Rhoades were evacuated from Guadalcanal in 1943.

These 4 coastwatchers were each awarded the US Army's Distinguished Service Cross. The medal is awarded to personnel who display extraordinary heroism in combat with an armed enemy force.

Battle of Savo Island

On 8 August 1942, a Japanese naval task force sailed from the islands of New Britain and New Ireland toward Guadalcanal. Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa was planning a night attack on Allied naval forces.

Mikawa aimed to disrupt the Allies' landings by attacking their landing and escort forces. One of the escort forces, commanded by Rear Admiral Crutchley, included the HMA Ships Australia, Canberra and Hobart.

The Allies had 3 escort forces (southern, northern and eastern) patrolling the entries to Savo Sound and protecting the landing ships. On the night of 8 August, the Allies deployed their landing forces in 2 groups.

A combination of circumstances allowed Mikawa's task force to sail unseen through ‘the Slot’ (New Georgia Sound) into Savo Sound. In convoy, the Japanese cruiser and destroyer force moved through the gap between Guadalcanal and Savo Island in the very early morning on 9 August.

At 1:31 am, Mikawa ordered his ships to attack, taking the Allied fleet by surprise.

The battle that followed was brief but fierce. The Japanese ships fired heavily on and torpedoed the Allied ships.

HMAS Canberra was quickly disabled and unable to return fire. Shellfire hitting the Canberra destroyed its bridge, fatally wounding its captain and setting the ship on fire.

The 3 US heavy cruisers – Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes – were destroyed.

The Japanese lost no ships, although their flagship, Chokai, was damaged with over 30 casualties.

At around 2 am, Mikawa ended the battle by withdrawing his task force.

The Japanese did not damage any of the Allied landing ships, which were unloading troops and supplies on the beaches of Guadalcanal Island.

Historians have described this as ‘a model action and tactical masterpiece’ for the Japanese forces. It has also been described as one of the worst naval disasters in US history. There was a formal US Navy Board of Inquiry into the battle afterwards.

[img https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C328026 alt="About 50 people wearing naval uniforms gather for an informal photograph on the deck of a naval warship with water and forested land visible." <caption>Members of the ship's company of HMAS Canberra, at sea, 1942. They are gathered on one of the cruiser's 6-inch turrets in front of the 20mm Oerlikon guns and a searchlight. The loss of the Canberra after the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 caused the deaths of 84 crew members. The burning ship was evacuated before being scuttled by Allied ships.]

Loss of HMAS Canberra

HMAS Canberra was still afloat the morning of 9 August but burning badly. The USS Patterson drew alongside to help fight the fire.

At 6 am on 9 August, the crew of the Canberra was ordered to abandon ship. US Ships Blue and Patterson rescued the survivors.

Admiral Fletcher, who was withdrawing all Allied ships from Savo Sound, ordered the Canberra to be scuttled (sunk deliberately) if it could not leave with the fleet.

At 8 am on 10 August 1942, US destroyers sank the Canberra in Savo Sound. This took 300 shells and 5 torpedoes.

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The Australian official naval history records that the Canberra was disabled by 24 Japanese shells that hit the ship. More recent studies and eyewitness accounts suggest it was hit by a torpedo from USS Bagley.

The survivors were transferred to the liberty ship, USS President Grant, and transported to Sydney. Except for the wounded, the crew was kitted out and granted 14 days of leave to recover. Many of them later served aboard HMAS Shropshire, Canberra's replacement.

Serving as a cook on HMAS Canberra, Ted Trappett, survived the action and later served on HMAS Shropshire. He recalled how the Japanese ships surprised the Allied ships at Guadalcanal:

And then we went up to Guadalcanal [on HMAS Canberra] and the Australian, the Hobart and several other ships went into Guadalcanal but went around Savo right to Tulagi. That was on the Friday, and we landed the troops on the Friday, and there was a bit of activity in the air. There were some planes coming over. And then on the Saturday morning, torpedo bombers attacked us, and we shot down a couple of those and then on the Saturday night, on the Saturday afternoon, about 6 o’clock, they told us that the Japs were on the way to attack us and they said that they’d be there at 4 o’clock in the morning, but unfortunately they arrived at 2 o’clock. And it was amazing to think that there were 2 [Allied] destroyers patrolling between 2 points only about 20 or 30 mile apart, and they missed 7 Japanese ships coming in, and they sailed in past them.

Sub-Lieutenant Mac Gregory was on the bridge of HMAS Canberra when it was hit:

We were the southern force. When Fletcher suddenly took his carriers off, Admiral Turner, in charge of the landing, called for Admiral Crutchley, who was the second in command, to take the Australia over to Guadalcanal for a conference, and with Vandergrift, they decided they would have to abandon the next morning and leave. So we were without our flagship, and we were leading the Chicago, who was the senior ship, but he decided to stay astern of us 300 yards, and I had the midnight to 4 watch, and I’d just gone on watch at midnight on the night of 8–9 August. I was on the bridge. It was 1:43 in the morning, and I had to call the navigator at quarter to 2 so I could remember the time very well, and all of sudden, mayhem broke loose. There was an explosion to the north. There was someone flashing to us, and all of a sudden, there were Japanese, 6 cruisers and a destroyer, about 3,000 yards, firing 8-inch guns and torpedoes at us. The bridge got hit, and I was relieved by the navigator. We got hit, in fact, by about 28 8-inch shells, and I virtually walked around 2 or 3. The captain was mortally wounded, and the gunnery officer was killed. Everyone on the bridge, except the navigator and I, were either dead or shot, and we were not able to fire a shot. We suddenly took up a list to starboard. There were fires going on. Ammunition exploding. It was just mayhem.

Read an eyewitness account of the sinking of the HMAS Canberra.

Watch oral history interviews with veterans of HMAS Canberra who survived the Battle of Savo Island:

• Edward 'Ted' Trappett, RAN
• Mackenzie 'Mac' Gregory, RAN.

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Casualties

The US Navy recorded over 1,500 casualties, including more than 900 lives lost.

The RAN recorded nearly 200 casualties. Of about 670 crew on board HMAS Canberra, 84 were killed in action or died from wounds, and 109 were wounded. This includes 5 of the 7 members of the No 9 Squadron RAAF attached to HMAS Canberra who were killed.

Listed among the war dead was Canberra's commanding officer, Captain Frank Getting. Getting remained at his post in command, refusing medical treatment despite his severe wounds. After being evacuated to a US hospital ship, he died from his wounds on 9 August 1942 and was buried at sea.

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Intense fire

HMAS Canberra was severely damaged during the battle, which caused fires that quickly got out of control.

The crew managed to prevent the fire from spreading to the 9th Squadron RAAF Walrus, an amphibious aircraft mounted on the catapult. The aircraft, which contained about 2,000 gallons (91,000 L) of fuel, was lost with the ship, but its tank never caught fire.

The intense fire was fuelled by several layers of paint applied since 1925. As a result, the RAN directed all combustible material to be removed from HMAS Australia. Where paint work was necessary, a minimum of 2 coats was deemed sufficient.

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Influence of the campaign

Guadalcanal was essential to securing Australia's sea lines of communication. Losing this campaign would have stopped international trade and weakened Australia's economy, military strength and social stability.

An immediate effect was that Japanese submarines were sent to Guadalcanal. This meant a temporary end to their attacks on the Australian coast. Japanese submarines had been attacking and harassing merchant (cargo) and passenger ships on the east and west coasts. Many Allied ships had been sunk, and many lives had been lost.

Guadalcanal and Kokoda

The Guadalcanal Campaign influenced the Kokoda Track Campaign in several ways, such as:

• forcing the Japanese high command to revise its planning to capture Port Moresby
• weakening the Japanese army's strength at Kokoda because its command prioritised a victory at Guadalcanal
• limiting the concentration of Japan's elite army forces in the New Guinea Campaign, leading to a loss of offensive actions at Kokoda
• weakening the Japanese naval and air support needed to reinforce troops at Guadalcanal and Kokoda.

By late October 1942, Japanese forces had experienced many serious defeats at Guadalcanal, as well as losing many ships, aircraft and experienced aircrew.

The situation worsened throughout November. By early December 1942, the Japanese navy could no longer supply or reinforce troops at Guadalcanal. Japanese forces there were losing about 50 men a day to malnutrition, disease and Allied attacks.

The Japanese decided to abandon Guadalcanal. The evacuation started in January 1943. By early February, all Japanese troops had left.

On 9 February 1943, US Army Major General Patch declared that Guadalcanal was secure.

On 22 January 1943, the Allies finally took Buna–Gona. But the Japanese had not abandoned their aim to take Port Moresby. Combat continued in Papua, New Guinea and surrounds.