During World War II, the Allies were fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific. The Kokoda Track Campaign was a series of battles fought between Australian and Japanese forces in Papua New Guinea. In 1942, New Guinea and Papua were Australian territories.
The Japanese wanted to take Port Moresby from the Allies. It was strategically important for their Pacific campaign and it had airstrips. The Australians tried to defend the Kokoda Track. This mountainous path was the only way for the Japanese to get to Port Moresby on foot.
The campaign was tough for the Australians. They had to fight in difficult conditions, such as steep mountains, thick jungles and harsh weather. They suffered from diseases like malaria, and they were low on supplies. But they were determined to stop the Japanese from advancing.
After many battles, the Australians were able to push the Japanese back. Eventually, the Japanese retreated. The campaign was a turning point in the Pacific war. It also showed that the Australians could fight hard against a powerful enemy.
Australian troops and Papuan carriers stop at an allied base at Eora Creek Village on their way out of a forward area in the Kokoda region for a well-earned spell. The soldier front left is believed to be SX13157 Private John Charles Smith, 2/6th Field Ambulance (see also 013284). Photographed by Damien Parer. AWM 013260
Importance of Port Moresby
Japanese forces were landing on the north coast of Papua from July 1942. Their aim was to take Port Moresby from the Allies.
Port Moresby was a strategically important Allied military base. The airfield could be used to support an attack on Japanese-occupied Rabaul.
For the Japanese, Port Moresby was a buffer between Rabaul and the Allied countries of Australia and New Zealand. Port Moresby could also be used as a launching point for the Japanese to attack the north of Australia. The Japanese aimed to seize the airfields at Port Moresby, Milne Bay, Buna and Kokoda to use as military bases.
In 1942 and early 1943, the Japanese made many invasion attempts on Port Moresby and conducted 94 air raids.
Overland track
After their naval advance failed in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese tried to take Port Moresby by land.
The only way for the Japanese to advance to Port Moresby was on foot, across the Owen Stanley Range, a series of immense ridges. They established beachheads at Buna and Gona on the northern coast of Papua. Then they advanced towards Port Moresby on the island's southern coast.
The Japanese knew the Kokoda Track was not passable by vehicles even before they began their campaign. Their spies had been gathering information on the region from as early as 1931.
[img - map, page 8 of the DVA book KOKODA: Exploring the Second World War campaign in Papua New Guinea - alt text="Detail of the Kokoda Track in the Australian Territory of Papua, from Port Moresby on the Coral Sea up to Gona and Buna on the Soloman Sea; an inset shows the location of the map area in Papua, south of New Guinea" <caption>Map of the Kokoda Track in Papua at the time of the New Guinea Campaign in World War II.</caption>]
Allied forces and strategy
The 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2AIF) formed Maroubra Force on 21 June 1942 to oppose the initial Japanese advance. It comprised:
At first, the Japanese had a series of victories over the Australian forces stationed on the track. The Australians, weakened by exhaustion and illness, could not push the Japanese back.
As the Japanese pushed the Australians back to Port Moresby, the Australians started to benefit from the arrival of fresh reinforcements and supplies. When the Japanese were ordered to retreat in the wake of their defeat on Guadalcanal, the Australian forces were strong enough to follow them.
Where they served
Allied forces engaged with Japanese forces along the Kokoda Track at:
- Kokoda
- Deniki
- Isurava
- Eora
- Efogi
- Templeton’s Crossing
- Ioribaiwa
- Oivi-Gorari.
Conditions for soldiers
Along the Kokoda Track, the conditions for soldiers were treacherous. Mountainous terrain with dense jungle and impassable creeks in valleys made fighting difficult. A hot, humid climate and drenching rain added to the troops' problems.
Caring for the sick and wounded was nearly impossible in some areas, especially when Papuan carriers were not available.
Learn more about the challenges of jungle warfare.
Dividing Japan's forces
In August 1942, Allied forces invaded the Japanese base at Guadalcanal in the neighbouring Solomon Islands. This action drew Japanese forces away from Kokoda.
Japan's attention was now divided, leading to a string of Allied victories in Papua:
- Allied victory at Milne Bay from 25 August to 7 September 1942
- Australian victory at Eora-Templeton's Crossing, when they attacked Japanese forces in the act of retreat on 28 October 1942
- Australian recapture of Kokoda on 2 November 1942
- Australian victory at Oivi-Gorari on 10 November 1942
- Australian and US forces advance along the coast towards Buna, starting in mid-November 1942.
Allied aircraft could attack Japanese ground forces almost unopposed. Facing a series of losses, the Japanese decided they could only hold their base between Gona and Buna.
In December 1942, the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. They sent significant land and air reinforcements to Papua, but it was too late.
First phase - Japanese advance
Japanese invasion and advance at Kokoda
A small Japanese force landed in Papua on 8 March, in advance of the main body of the South Seas Detachment (Nankai Shitai). Its objectives were to seize Kokoda and examine the practicality of advancing on foot along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby.
Colonel Yokoyama Yosuke, commander of 15 Independent Engineer Regiment, led the 'Japanese Yokoyama Advance Butai force' ashore unopposed at Basabua, about 2.5 km east of Gona, in the late afternoon of 21 July 1942.
All troops, equipment and supplies disembarked before dawn the following morning, and the ships had sailed. They wanted to be clear of the coast when Allied aircraft arrived looking for them.
A week later, a second convoy brought the rest of Yokoyama's force, giving him 4,020 men, including 1,200 carriers from New Britain. Only one-third of the second convoy were fighting troops. Many were engineers, sappers and administrators.
Yokoyama's force would continue to grow to more than 14,000 men.
By then, the foremost Japanese troops were almost at Kokoda.
The night of the first landing, a company of infantry was driven inland as soon as trucks could be unloaded. When the road ended, the Japanese loaded their equipment onto carts and bicycles and continued their rapid advance.
On 23 July, the first engagement of the campaign took place near Awala. Under Major William Watson, 38 men of the Papuan Infantry Battalion fired on the Japanese and then retreated. A private of the battalion said that they each fired 8 or 9 rounds, 'then Major Watson told us to run for our lives'.
Later that day, a platoon of the 39th Infantry Battalion also briefly delayed the Japanese. Similar short clashes took place on 24 July at the crossing of the Kumusi River and on 25 July at Gorari.
So far, all the encounters had been only a few minutes long and were fought between 40 or so Papuans, Australians, and the Japanese advanced guard. But the next engagement at Oivi was a more serious affair.
When the Japanese had landed, the widely dispersed Allied defenders in the region numbered 420 men of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, the Royal Papuan Constabulary and B Company of the 39th Battalion. By 26 July, 145 men from all 3 units had been collected at Oivi, 16 km east of Kokoda. Watson and Captain Samuel Templeton of the 39th Battalion decided to make a stand.
The Japanese were held up for several hours until, when threatened with encirclement, the Papuans and Australians retreated. During the Oivi engagement, Templeton, after whom Templeton's Crossing on the Kokoda Track is named, was wounded and captured. He was later interrogated and then executed.
A fighting retreat
Australian Maroubra Force troops, already on the Kokoda Track, tried to halt or delay the Japanese advance.
Allied Intelligence knew that the Japanese force that had landed at Basabua was much greater than that which the Papuans and Australians had on hand north of the Owen Stanley Range. It was logical that if the Allies stood and fought for long, they would be surrounded and annihilated.
Captain Samuel Templeton, who commanded the Australians early in the campaign, told his subordinates:
Your action should be contact and rearguard only – no do-or-die stunts.
Templeton's advice was followed during brief rearguard stands at Awala, Wairopi, Gorari and Oivi, but the 2 Kokoda engagements were, to a degree, an exception.
Whoever held the Kokoda airstrip could fly in reinforcements and supplies. This location was so important that it was worth risking Maroubra Force in something more than a short rearguard fight.
Lieutenant Colonel William Owen, who took over after Templeton's capture at Oivi, stood against the Japanese at Kokoda. But the force was defeated, and Owen was killed.
Templeton's successor, Major Alan Cameron, was briefly able to recapture the strip 10 days later, but the Allies were eventually forced to fall back into the mountains.
First engagement at Kokoda, 28 July 1942
At the first of 2 engagements at Kokoda, the Japanese defeated Lieutenant Colonel Owen's force and captured the airstrip from which they expected to receive supplies from Rabaul.
After the stand at Oivi, the combined Papuan-Australian force fell back to Deniki. Then, as the Japanese did not immediately take Kokoda, Owen's force reoccupied it on 28 July 1942. He expected to be reinforced by air. Two Allied transport aircraft circled the field but, unsure if the Japanese were present, they didn't land.
By the time they had withdrawn to Kokoda, Owen’s force was down to about 80 men, including 20 Papuans from the Papuan Infantry Battalion and the Royal Papuan Constabulary. He placed them in an arc around the northern end of the plateau on which the Kokoda administration buildings stood. His opponent was Captain Tetsuo Ogawa, commander of No. 1 Company of the first battalion of 144 Regiment. Both Ogawa and Owen were killed in the engagement.
Ogawa's force outnumbered the Australians. It was reinforced with Orokaiva scouts, a Papuan people who had sided with the Japanese. There was also a platoon of engineers, a detachment from the battalion's machine gun company and one 70 mm gun.
Ogawa began his attack at 2:30 am on 29 July.
Approaching from the north, Ogawa's men were stopped by the Australians on the plateau, where Owen was shot early in the fighting. Ogawa then sent a platoon out to the west and another to the east to feel for the Australian flanks. At this time, the Japanese artillerymen found the correct range, and their shells began inflicting casualties on Owen's force. The mortal wounding of Owen, the enemy to the flank, combined with accurate artillery fire, caused the Australian line to collapse about an hour after the fight commenced.
Major Watson of the Papuan Infantry Battalion assumed command and ordered the force to make for Deniki. A fortunate mist obscured the moonlight and concealed the retreat.
The Australians lost 7 killed and 6 wounded at Kokoda. The Japanese lost 12 killed and 26 wounded.
Owen's decision to try to hold Kokoda was correct.
New Guinea Force was hoping to fly in a company of infantry each day. All day on 29 July, a company of 49th Battalion was sitting by the runway at Port Moresby, waiting to be airlifted to Kokoda. This potential doubling of Owen's force did not occur because communications between Port Moresby and Kokoda were not functioning. Had it occurred, the outcome of the campaign may well have been different.
The main body of the Japanese force was still at Sanananda, 6 days' march away. It could easily have transpired that, by the time Ogawa attacked with one company, there were 2 Australian companies present. By the time the Japanese could attack Kokoda with a full battalion, there could have been 2 Australian battalions defending it.
If the Australians had held the Kokoda airstrip on 29 July, there might not have been a campaign in the mountains along the Kokoda Track.
Second engagement at Kokoda, 8 August 1942
After the first Kokoda engagement on the night of 28 to 29 July, the Australians retreated to Deniki...
Both sides awaited reinforcements. With the death of Owen at Kokoda, Major Cameron arrived to take over Maroubra Force. By the first week of August, Maroubra Force had grown to 550 men, mostly from 39th Battalion.
Leaving a reserve at Deniki, Cameron moved with 430 men to retake Kokoda. On the morning of 8 August, he took companies A, C and D down the main track from Deniki towards Kokoda.
At the same time, a second force of one company under Captain Bidstrup moved north-east to Pirivi. They aimed to block the track by which Japanese reinforcements might come from the north coast to Kokoda.
A third force, a company under Captain Symington, marched between these 2 Australian forces along another track from Deniki to Kokoda, unknown to the Japanese.
Cameron's force on the main track bumped into a Japanese battalion coming the other way.
By coincidence, the Japanese battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hatsuo, had begun his attack on Deniki, where he knew the Australians to be, on the same day Cameron commenced his own advance.
Tsukamoto's battalion numbered around 520. He also had additional support troops, including Japanese combat engineers who fought Bidstrup's company, small signals and medical detachments, and an artillery platoon with one mountain gun. There were around 660 Japanese in total against around 430 Australians.
Soon realising he was considerably outnumbered on the main track, Cameron withdrew to Deniki. Tsukamoto, surprised to find the Australians had advanced on him when he'd expected to be the attacker, slowly and carefully followed Cameron's withdrawal.
On the central track, Symington's company found no Japanese at all until they entered Kokoda. There they encountered a platoon of Japanese engineers who did not stay to fight but retreated along the track to Pirivi. Symington's men dug in on the ridge overlooking the Kokoda airstrip on the same ground Owen had defended 9 days before.
The Japanese planned to establish a 'supply dump' at Kokoda. This was a temporary area allocated for supply storage. For this reason, a company of Japanese engineers was in the area to improve their supply line. One platoon was building a bridge near Pirivi when Bidstrup's company, which was the easternmost of the 3-pronged Australian attack, ran into them.
The Japanese at Kokoda were later reinforced by another engineer platoon, which Symington saw leaving Kokoda in the direction of Pirivi. Bidstrup's men fought the Japanese engineers until dark and then withdrew to Deniki.
By 9 August, both commanders' plans had been confounded.
Like Tsukamoto, Cameron had expected to be the attacker but found himself under attack. His 2 outer prongs had been repulsed, and the central one, under Symington, was holding Kokoda but was cut off from the rest of Maroubra Force.
Tsukamoto brought the main body of his battalion up to Deniki but was reluctant to make his attack until he was sure Kokoda was cleared of what he believed was a small force of Australians. He sent back just one company to retake it. This company proved insufficient. All its attacks over that day and the following night were repulsed.
Because Cameron was unsure if Symington was even at Kokoda, no consideration was given to the possibility of flying reinforcements to the Kokoda airstrip.
On 10 August, Symington, having had no communication at all with Cameron and getting low on ammunition and food, decided to withdraw to Deniki. As the most direct routes were blocked, his company eluded the Japanese by heading west across the airstrip and then south towards Deniki.
Over 3 days of fighting, the Australians lost 23 men killed and 17 injured, and the Japanese had 21 killed and 44 wounded.
Japanese postpone plans to take Port Moresby
The second Kokoda engagement had notable strategic consequences out of all proportion to the size of the force engaged.
Cameron's bold attack at Kokoda came as a surprise, not just to Tsukamoto, but also to his superiors in Rabaul, who did not anticipate there would be many Australians on the north side of the Owen Stanley Range.
Harukichi Hyakutake, 17th Army commander, reasoned that if the Australians were bold enough to retake Kokoda, even if only briefly, then they must have a large force, estimated to be 1,200 strong. This first prompted the Japanese to consider the idea of postponing the attack on Port Moresby until more troops arrived in Papua, more supplies were accumulated, and Milne Bay was taken.
This line of thinking was reinforced when the Japanese heard that the US landing at Guadalcanal on 7 August would be a greater problem for the Japanese than first thought.
By 16 August, the decision to postpone the attempt to take Port Moresby had been made in Rabaul. Senior Japanese officers interviewed after the war thought that the factor most influencing the postponement was not Guadalcanal but rather 'stronger than anticipated Australian resistance at Kokoda'.
Into the mountains
Before Deniki the fighting took place in low-lying country north of the Owen Stanley Range...
After the Japanese entered the Owen Stanley Range in pursuit of the Australians, a couple of things changed.
First, the rugged, jungled slopes on which the fighting took place altered the tactics used.
In the low country, marching around the enemy flank to threaten their rear was easier. In the mountains, both sides were to find this was still possible, but extremely difficult and slow.
The Kokoda Track became the major tactical feature. If the Australians could block it and not be cut off from supplies coming up the track, then they would stop the Japanese.
The second thing that changed was that Maroubra Force was strongly reinforced.
Abandoning a delay-and-retire policy, the Australians were now strong enough to make 3 determined (but unsuccessful) attempts to stop the Japanese at Isurava, Efogi and Ioribaiwa.
Falling back to Deniki 12 to 14 August 1942
After the second Kokoda engagement, the Australians retired to Deniki. There they were attacked by the Japanese and driven back to Isurava.
In the several days between the end of the second Kokoda engagement and the beginning of the Japanese attack on Deniki, the Maroubra Force commander, Major Cameron, reorganised his force. He brought up from reserve a fresh company of 39th Battalion to give the 2 companies a rest. The men had borne the brunt of the earlier fighting. Sickness began to deplete the force, reducing Cameron's effective troops to about 470 men.
The Japanese commander Tsukamoto was on his way to attack Deniki when Cameron's retaking of Kokoda upset his plans.
The importance of Deniki was that it overlooked Kokoda, 6 km to the north. It was at the junction of other tracks leading north-east towards Oivi. It also guarded the entrance to Eora Gorge, along which the Kokoda Track went south towards Isurava.
A week later, with Kokoda back in Japanese hands, Tsukamoto was able to go ahead with the planned attack on Deniki. He had 450 men, his own battalion, and its single artillery piece.
On 12 August, Tsukamoto's scouts sought out the enemy position. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the Japanese scouts located at least one Australian platoon position that, when the attack started the next day, was immediately the target of accurate artillery fire.
Wary of losing too many men, Tsukamoto's attack progressed slowly and methodically. Japanese experience in the war to this point taught them a useful lesson; an enemy could often be 'worried' out of their position by a day of probing and skirmishing, preferably around the flanks to give rise to fear for their line of retreat, followed by a night of enough of the same to keep the enemy sleepless and anxious.
The day of 13 August and the following night conformed to this pattern.
By the morning of 14 August, it was perhaps the effect of the Japanese tactics on his soldiers' steadiness, or the reports of Japanese in the rear, that persuaded Cameron to withdraw. It was well that he did, for soon after, Tsukamoto decided that he had softened up the Australians to the point where a major attack by 2 infantry companies should be successful. When the attack swept into Deniki, the Australians were gone.
The stand at Isurava 26 to 31 August 1942
In late August, both the Australians and the Japanese were greatly reinforced and prepared for a decisive battle at Isurava. While the Japanese were victorious, they failed to achieve their main objective – the total destruction of Maroubra Force.
Plans and forces present
Since the loss of the Kokoda airstrip, the Australian objective had been to drive back the Japanese and recover it. This would ensure a regular supply of food and ammunition. However, by the last week of August, it was realised that the Japanese were now too strong, so Brigadier Potts's orders were changed. He was told to adopt a defensive stance and prevent the Japanese from penetrating the Owen Stanley Range towards Port Moresby.
Under Brigadier Arnold William Potts's command, Maroubra Force dug in and awaited the Japanese attack on both sides of Eora Creek at Isurava.
Along the bottom of a steep V-shaped gorge, the creek ran north towards Kokoda. On the left, as the Australians looked at it, was Isurava village, where the 2/14th and 39th Battalions stood. On the right side of the gorge was the 53rd Battalion and half of the 2/16th Battalion. The other half of this battalion was held in reserve.
With the various headquarters and detachments of 2/6th Field Ambulance, the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, the Royal Papuan Constabulary and the Papuan Infantry Battalion, there were about 2,290 men present.
Lieutenant General Horii Tomitaro, the Japanese commander, was anxious to destroy the Australian force as soon as possible before it either counterattacked towards Kokoda or withdrew further into the mountains. Consequently, when the main body of the South Seas Detachment arrived by sea, he ordered it to march 120 km to Isurava immediately.
Japanese supply difficulties had resulted in the overloading of their men with food and ammunition. The combination of a week-long forced march and heavy packs resulted in many Japanese soldiers falling out along the way to Isurava. These men failed to arrive in time for the battle, leaving Horii about 3,000 men with which to attack.
Horii planned the total destruction of the Australians by a double envelopment. He had 4 infantry battalions but wished to keep one battalion out of the battle so it would be fresh to pursue the enemy afterwards. The others, the 3 battalions of 144 Regiment, were to be deployed thus:
- 1/144 Battalion would attack and pin the Australian centre about Isurava.
- 2/144 Battalion would attack along the eastern side of the gorge against the Australian right flank; if the Australians did not commit their reserve to halt this battalion, it would proceed to cut the track junction in the Australian rear at Alola.
- 3/144 Battalion would be sent around the Australian left; if all went as planned, there would be no Australian reserves left to oppose this move, which would complete the encirclement of the defenders.
Battle of Isurava
Horii's plan to destroy Maroubra Force came completely unstuck.
First, the battalion selected for the frontal attack, 1/144, was in poor condition. It had been in Papua the longest of all Horii's battalions and had taken the most casualties.
When Horii's main attack began on 27 August, 1/144 did not go at the Australians with the vigour Horii expected. He strengthened 1/144 with one company from 3/144, thus weakening 3/144 for its later move around the Australian left. Though reinforced, 1/144 continued to disappoint Horii.
On 29 August, an Australian counterattack, in which Private Bruce Kingsbury won a Victoria Cross, cut right through a company of this battalion and killed the company commander.
The second problem for the Japanese was that most of their artillery could not keep up with the forced march. Just 3 of 10 artillery pieces were available. The battalion gun of 2/144 went with it across to the east of the gorge. The other 2 guns were placed on high ground overlooking Isurava. From there, they could fire to support any Japanese attacks.
On 27 August, to the east of the Eora Creek gorge, 2/144 failed to make much headway against the Australian 53rd and 2/16th Battalions. The next day, the Japanese battalion commander decided to make a flank march through the jungle to get behind the Australians. His battalion became lost in the jungle, so there was little fighting east of the gorge that day.
When 3/144 made its flank march around the Australian left on the west side of the gorge, it too became lost. It blundered into the left of the Australian line instead of getting into the Australian rear as intended.
Having made little progress so far, Horii felt obligated to commit the battalion he was trying to keep fresh for the pursuit. This battalion was sent on a wide outflanking move well around the Australian left and emerged on the track far in their rear, near Alola village. These men also found it impossible to navigate accurately in the jungle. The battalion wandered far from the battle and did not emerge until the fighting was over. At Isurava, this battalion's commander said, 'we didn't fire a shot or lose a man.'
Japanese blunders notwithstanding, by the night of 29 August, the Australians had committed all their reserves. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Key, commander of the 2/14th Battalion, advised Potts that the position could not be held on the following day. Potts accepted this advice and withdrew Maroubra Force to Isurava rest house, 1 km south of the original position.
Meanwhile, an Australian withdrawal was not necessary to the east of the gorge. There, on 29 August, the attack of 2/144 was again held up by the 53rd and the 2/16th Battalions.
At dawn on 30 August, the Japanese 1/144 Battalion, unaware of the Australian withdrawal on the Isurava side of the gorge, bombarded and assaulted the now-empty Australian position.
The Australians settled into the Isurava rest house position about 1 km to the south. This was one of several rest houses along the length of the track, where the men could stop and rest, have some food and try to get some sleep. There, they came under attack from the high ground to their west.
What had happened was 3/144, which had the previous day wandered unintentionally into the Australian left, swung out west and then south again that night and made for what they supposed would be the Australian rear. Instead, they found the Australians in their new position at the Isurava rest house.
By now, more Japanese guns had arrived, and a total of 8 were available to bombard the new Australian position in support of the attack of 3/144. This bombardment contributed to Potts's decision that the short retreat to the Isurava rest house was not the answer to his problem. Only a complete withdrawal of Maroubra Force would prevent its destruction.
The Australian retreat
Breaking contact with an aggressive enemy is a difficult wartime operation, and at Isurava, it was only partially successful.
Japanese attacks during the retreat caused the dispersion of hundreds of Australians into the jungle. Over the next week, most of these men were able to make their way back to the main body moving south along the Kokoda Track.
One notable exception was Colonel William George Key, commander of the 2/14th Battalion. He was captured, taken back to the Japanese base, interrogated then executed.
While Isurava was a notable Japanese victory, Horii had failed in his main aim to destroy the Australian force completely. Nor did the casualties inflicted by either side favour the Japanese.
Over the period from 25 August to 31 August, the Australians lost 99 killed and 111 wounded. The Japanese lost 140 killed and 231 wounded.
Eora to Templeton's Crossing 31 August to 5 September 1942
As a result of the defeat at Isurava, the Australians withdrew rapidly south along the Kokoda Track.
Covering the withdrawal was a large rearguard composed of the 2/16th and the 2/14th Battalions. These, especially the latter, had been dispersed as a result of the Isurava fighting and had only 700 men between them.
The fighting by 2/16th and 2/14th as they covered the withdrawal of Maroubra Force in the week after Isurava is known as the first Eora-Templeton's Crossing engagement.
Colonel Key of 2/14th was among those missing after Isurava, so Colonel Caro of 2/16th commanded the force.
The first position the Australians held was just south of Alola on the night of 30 August.
After dark, they withdrew. It was well that they did because a fresh Japanese pursuit group, elements of 41 Regiment, none of which had participated at Isurava, was advancing rapidly after them. With 1,305 men and 4 guns, its aim was to overtake and destroy the Australian rearguard.
When Colonel Yazawa Kiyomi, the regimental commander, saw the Australians drawn up south of Alola, he thought the position was too strong to attack frontally. At night, he sent his main force into the jungle to the west to circle around and attack the Australians from the rear. While this was in progress, the Australians withdrew and, for the third time in the campaign so far, a Japanese battalion wandered lost in the jungle, unable to find its enemy.
After losing a day to the error, Yazawa's pursuit group caught up with Caro's force, which was dug in on the southern heights above Eora village. This slope was where Australian war correspondent Damien Parer took his famous photographs.
Australian troops and Papuan carriers stop at an allied base at Eora Creek Village on their way out of a forward area in the Kokoda region for a well-earned spell. The soldier front left is believed to be SX13157 Private John Charles Smith, 2/6th Field Ambulance (see also 013284). Photographed by Damien Parer. AWM 013260
The line was held by 2/16th while 2/14th was behind it, ready to act as a reserve or to respond to a Japanese flank attack. The Japanese placed their artillery and machine gun company at the same height, to the north of the village. They would later use this tactic again when they defended the area during their retreat in October. Five infantry companies were available to them.
After an artillery bombardment of the Australians, the Japanese infantry made a night attack. Two were held in reserve, one attacked the Australians frontally, and 2 went around the Australian right flank.
By the early morning of 2 September, the Japanese had penetrated the Australian position in several places. Caro decided he must withdraw. The Japanese followed cautiously.
The following evening found the Australians further down the track at Templeton's Crossing. This time, Caro withdrew before the Japanese had time to develop their attack.
The following night, the Australians crossed Eora Creek onto the heights south of the creek and made another stand. The Japanese had only one gun forward to support their infantry, which again made a frontal pinning attack combined with a sweep around a flank. Both attacks were successful, and the Australians had either to withdraw or face destruction.
This withdrawal uncovered Myola, the dry lake in the mountains from which the Australians were receiving their supplies by air. The Australian rearguard then fell back to Efogi, where they rejoined Maroubra Force.
The First Battle of Eora Creek and Templeton's Crossing occurred from 31 August 1942 to 5 September 1942. The battle is rightfully regarded as a successful rearguard action on the part of the Australians.
The Japanese were faced with the choice of a fast advance, which would cost them more casualties, or a less-costly slow advance. In this phase of operations in the Owen Stanley Range, Colonel Kiyomi Yazawa opted for a slow advance to keep casualties down. He failed in this at the first battle of Eora Creek and Templeton's Crossing, which cost the Japanese 43 killed and 58 wounded against an Australian loss of 21 killed and 54 wounded.
Horii, the South Seas Detachment commander, was highly dissatisfied and removed Yazawa's regiment from the pursuit. He replaced it with 144 Regiment, which had been resting since Isurava. From an average advance of 2 km per day under Yazawa, the speed of the pursuit increased to 8 km per day. From the Australian perspective, the slow Japanese advance in the week after Isurava gave them time to prepare to make another stand, this time at Efogi.
Disaster at Efogi, 8 September 1942
Better known in Australia as the Battle of Mission Ridge-Brigade Hill, Efogi was, following Isurava, the next attempt to halt the Japanese advance. Again the Japanese were able to defeat the Australians by cutting the Kokoda Track in their rear.
Plans and forces present
On the basis that Maroubra Force had been reinforced by a fresh and experienced Australian Imperial Force battalion, the 2/27th, General Sydney Rowell in Port Moresby ordered Potts to stop retreating and make a stand.
Potts chose an excellent defensive position on a dominating hill feature south of Efogi. From there the Australians had, unusually for the Kokoda Track, a good view of the Japanese approach, as the track ran through several large open areas.
Potts was also able to call in effective air support. For example, the Japanese suffered 30 casualties as a result of a United States Army Air Force bombing as they advanced over the open ground on 6 and 7 September.
Normally Potts would have placed his fresh troops in reserve for a counterstroke once the Japanese plan of attack had revealed itself. However, he believed that the 2/16th and 2/14th Battalions must be rested. Both units had been fighting constantly for 2 weeks since Isurava.
Consequently, the 2/27th Battalion was placed in the front line on Mission Ridge while the other 2 battalions were placed behind in reserve on Brigade Hill. Behind them again, Potts positioned his headquarters with a company of infantry from 2/16th.
The deployment of the whole force, essentially in 3 parts, one behind the other with gaps in between, was to have important and unfortunate consequences.
The 3 infantry battalions, the headquarters, detachments of Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, the Royal Papuan Constabulary and 2/6th and 14th Field Ambulances, gave Maroubra Force almost exactly 1,400 men. An Australian composite infantry company arrived later in the battle, adding another 95 men.
Most of the South Seas Detachment then in the Owen Stanley Range was resting along the Kokoda Track between Eora village and Templeton's Crossing at the time of the fighting at Efogi.
The Japanese pursuit group which fought the battle was Colonel Kusunose Masao's 144 Regiment, less its first battalion. This battalion had been fighting in Papua since July. It was down to half-strength, and morale was poor. 144 was relegated to supply-carrying duties and did not participate in any fighting again until mid-October.
Kusunose's group, 2 battalions of the regiment, the regimental artillery and headquarters, together with an engineering company and small detachments of medical and signals personnel, totalled 1,570 men.
After scouting the Australian position, Kusunose determined that he would pin the Australians on Mission Ridge with one battalion while the other slipped around their flank to block the track behind them on Brigade Hill. He was unaware the Australians also held Brigade Hill. His artillery was placed north of Mission Ridge.
The engagement at Efogi
On 7 September, the Japanese attack began.
With artillery support, 3/144 Battalion came at the 2/27th on Mission Ridge. Though the fighting continued until early the following morning, the Japanese were unable to take any ground from the Australians, half of whose losses were due to bombardment from the 6 Japanese guns.
Frequently in the Kokoda Track Campaign, the Australians had to endure such bombardments without having the ability to reply. However, here there were two 3-inch mortars that fired upon the Japanese artillery, killing and wounding a dozen gunners.
As night fell on 7 September, the other Japanese battalion, 2/144, began its flank march into the Australian rear.
At Isurava and Eora, a manoeuvre of this kind had often resulted in the Japanese becoming lost in the jungle. Here they obtained local Papuan guides, and the mistake was not repeated.
At dawn, and with a measure of luck, 2/144 Battalion found the Kokoda Track. It was located in the Australian rear. They found it in a gap between 2/16th and 2/14th Battalions to their north, and Potts's headquarters to their south.
Now able to see the Australian positions around Brigade Hill, an artillery observer with 2/144 signalled the Japanese guns to switch their bombardment from Mission Ridge to Brigade Hill.
A counterattack was made by elements of 2/16th and 2/14th along the crest of Brigade Hill, just north of the knoll where the memorial now stands. Either because the 2 battalions had been much weakened by earlier fighting, or because they failed to realise how strong the Japanese force blocking the track was, the counterattack failed. Half of all Australian casualties at Efogi were lost here.
A smaller counterattack from Potts's headquarters south of the Japanese was also repulsed.
The Australian retreat
With the breakdown of all attempts to remove the Japanese from their blocking position on the Kokoda Track, and the loss of communications with Potts, Caro of 2/16th Battalion took command of all the Australians north of the Japanese.
Caro decided to retreat.
The Australians on Mission Ridge withdrew to join those on Brigade Hill, and they all cut their way south, through the jungle. As at Isurava, some succeeded in getting around the Japanese and rejoining their comrades, but others, owing to the speed with which the Japanese advanced, spent weeks in the jungle.
Australian casualties at Efogi were 87 dead and 77 wounded. The Japanese lost 60 dead and 165 wounded. These figures do not reflect the catastrophe for the Australians at Efogi.
An additional 500 men, mainly from 2/27th Battalion, could also be considered effectively lost to Maroubra Force: those who, without food, marched south through the mountains for up to 3 weeks before rejoining their own force. None of them returned to battle until December.
Just less than half of all the Australians who fought at Efogi were present for the next, and last defensive battle, a week later at Ioribaiwa Ridge.
Action at Ioribaiwa Ridge, 14 to 16 September 1942
At Ioribaiwa, 40 km from Port Moresby, the Australians assembled their largest force so far in the fighting in Papua. The Japanese attacked and, for the last time, drove the Australians from their position.
Plans and forces
After his failure at Efogi, Potts was replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter. Porter was reinforced by an Australian Imperial Force brigade under Brigadier Kenneth Eather, who then took command of Maroubra Force for the action at Ioribaiwa.
With the fresh 25th Brigade, Eather planned to attack the Japanese. He placed the 21st Brigade, which had fought at Efogi, with the 3rd Battalion in a defensive position on Ioribaiwa Ridge. He left one of his own battalions, 2/25th, in reserve behind them. The other 2 battalions of 25th Brigade were to outflank the Japanese, one on either side.
The Japanese struck first, as Eather was still deploying for his attack. Eather responded by calling off his offensive and adopting a defensive stance.
The main body of the South Seas Detachment was still in the rear, awaiting permission to recommence the advance on Port Moresby.
Kusunose's pursuit group fought the action at Ioribaiwa, the same force that had fought at Efogi, plus the mountain artillery. In all, the Japanese had about 1,650 fighting men present.
Action at Ioribaiwa
On 14 September, on the Australian left flank, the 2/31st Battalion, making in its own flanking move, encountered the Japanese 2/144 Battalion trying to do the same thing in the other direction. Neither battalion was able to gain any advantage over the other.
In the Australian centre, the 21st Brigade, much reduced by 3 weeks of fighting, was attacked by a half-battalion of 3/144 Battalion.
Kusunose had massed all his artillery, 8 guns, on a ridge north of Ioribaiwa and pounded the Australian centre. As had happened to 2/27th Battalion at Efogi, half of all the casualties in the 21st Brigade were to Japanese artillery bombardment.
The Australians held on, and Kusunose's infantry in the centre made no progress. His attack on the Australian left was similarly unsatisfactory, so he decided to try the Australian right flank with the half-battalion he had in reserve.
This new Japanese move began on 15 September. It failed to find the Australian right flank because the line was longer than Kusunose estimated and longer than Eather had planned.
When the first Japanese attack began, the Australian battalions about to advance found the Japanese flanks had, acting on Eather's orders, halted where they were at that time. By good fortune, this placed the Australian infantry battalions in a rough line, over 2 km long, along Ioribaiwa Ridge. The manoeuvring battalions effectively extended the line of the 21st Brigade to the right and to the left.
The Japanese half-battalion looking for the Australian right flank struck the line well short of the flank, between the 3rd Battalion and the 2/33rd Battalion. The Japanese managed to insert themselves there, but almost surrounded by Australians, it was all they could do to hold on.
A counterattack by a half-battalion of the Australian reserve, 2/25th, was unsuccessful, and one by 2/33rd failed to find the enemy in the thick jungle.
By the morning of 16 September, there was a stalemate.
Eather's left was held up by 2/144, his centre was under constant artillery bombardment and on his right, he was unable to eject the Japanese who had penetrated into his position.
From Kusunose's viewpoint, things were equally grim. His original flanking move on the Australian left had bumped into enemy soldiers where there should have been none. Unaware of the heavy casualties his artillery was inflicting on the Australian centre, he saw only that he had gained no ground there. On the Australian right, his second attempt at outflanking had also failed.
Eye-to-eye, Eather was the first of the 2 commanders to blink. He requested and received permission to withdraw to Imita Ridge. By the evening of 16 September, the Australians were safely in the new position.
Australian casualties were 49 killed and 121 wounded, or around 5% of the force on Ioribaiwa Ridge. The Japanese lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.
With hindsight, it is apparent that, unlike the previous encounters in the mountains, the Australians were not defeated but rather fought the Japanese to a draw. However, by withdrawing, Eather showed that, ignorant of his significant numerical advantage, he saw himself as defeated. He offered a number of plausible reasons for pulling back to Imita Ridge, but the central one can be found in his signal to his superior, Major General Allen: 'Do not consider can hold him (the Japanese) here'.
Interlude at Imita Ridge
Between 17 September and 10 October, the Australians consolidated their positions and gathered intelligence about the positions and movement of the Japanese forces.
Through small attacks and patrols, the Australians learned that Ioribaiwa and Nauro were unoccupied. The last of the Japanese troops had been ordered to withdraw from Nauro on 26 September.
At the end of this interlude, the Australians prepared to advance - to make a counterattack - from 4 defensive positions:
- the main Myola track
- the original Mount Bellamy track
- Templeton's Crossing, where the 2 tracks rejoined
- Eora Village.
Second phase - Australian counter-offensive
At the end of September 1942, the Japanese retreated from their southernmost point of advance, just 40 km from Port Moresby.
The reason for the retreat was that Guadalcanal was going badly for the Japanese. Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo deemed it wise not to stick their neck out too far in Papua until the Guadalcanal problem was resolved.
However, the Japanese did not abandon hope of making another attack on Port Moresby in the future. So they only retreated as far as the Templeton's Crossing-Eora region.
There, the Australians attacked and defeated them in October 1942. The Japanese fell back to Oivi-Gorari but, in November, were again defeated. This time decisively. The remnant of the South Seas Detachment now had no choice but to retreat to Sanananda to try to hold their base.
Australian advance to Eora 13 to 27 October 1942
After the Japanese retreat from Ioribaiwa Ridge, they dug in to defend a series of positions along the Kokoda track from Templeton's Crossing to Eora village. In 2 weeks of continuous fighting, the Australians overcame the Japanese and drove them from the Owen Stanley Range. It was their first victory on the Kokoda Track.
Australians on the offensive
The Australians were now on the offensive. They were fighting their way north along the same track on which they had suffered defeat after defeat from July to September.
Reinforcements, mostly from 7th Division, increased Maroubra Force to 4,600 men.
Supply problems persuaded Major General Samuel Allen, commander of 7th Division and now also Maroubra Force commander, that all his force could not be used in the front line at one time. He decided to alternate his 2 infantry brigades forward, just as the Japanese had done in their advance.
After a 2-week pursuit from Ioribaiwa, 1,882 men of the 25th Brigade with the 3rd Militia battalion attached encountered the Japanese defences.
Australian firepower had been enhanced. The value of the Thompson submachine gun was apparent in jungle fighting. Where possible, the number of this weapon in each battalion was doubled. In addition, one Vickers medium machine gun and one 3-inch mortar were now carried with most battalions.
The Japanese had not given up hope that they would win at Guadalcanal and so be able to reinforce Papua and again advance on Port Moresby. Indeed in the midst of the Eora-Templeton's fighting, Horii, the South Seas Detachment commander now back at Kokoda, was told that 38 Division was to be sent to reinforce him. His superior, Hyakutake in Rabaul, changed his mind later and sent this division to Guadalcanal. But in mid-October, Horii had good reason to expect to be able to hold Eora-Templeton's until events once again favoured the Emperor's cause.
Horii ordered 4 positions to be entrenched. First, there were 2 forward posts, one on each of 2 tracks leading north from Kagi. If pressed, the Japanese on these 2 tracks would retire to the main position overlooking Templeton's Crossing, where the 2 tracks joined. This was where Horii expected to stop the Australians. Although, as insurance against failure, Horii ordered a fourth position to be constructed at Eora village.
First phase of the Eora-Templeton's Crossing action
On 13 October, the Australians found and attacked the 2 outlying Japanese posts garrisoned by 667 men with 3 artillery pieces. The 2/25th Battalion failed to make any headway against the smaller Japanese post on the track over Mount Bellamy. On the Kokoda track 2/33rd Battalion, up against all 3 Japanese guns on what the Battalion called Myola Ridge, was similarly stopped cold. The 3rd Battalion was brought up to support 2/33rd on 14 October, but the next day, the Japanese on both tracks withdrew to the main Templeton's position.
Second phase of the Eora-Templeton's Crossing action
The second phase of fighting at Eora-Templeton's was at the main Japanese position overlooking the crossing of Eora Creek at Templeton's Crossing. Allen closed up to the Japanese with 25th Brigade and, during the fighting, committed 16th Brigade to replace the worn battalions of 25th Brigade. Thus over 3,000 Australians were engaged in the course of phase 2 but never more than 2,000 at one time.
The Japanese were not reinforced to the same degree. Tsukamoto, now commander of 144 Regiment, took over the Stanley Detachment, as their force in the mountains was called, and brought with him the majority of his much depleted regiment. At Templeton's Crossing he had at least 800 men.
The decisive moment of the second phase took place on 20 October. The Australian 2/2nd Battalion worked around to high ground on the Japanese left and on this day attacked and broke into the position prompting a hasty Japanese retreat. This was the first time in the campaign that Australian infantry had closed with dug-in Japanese defences and captured them outright.
Third phase of the Eora-Templeton's Crossing action
The 2/2nd Battalion attack was the turning point of the entire 2 weeks fighting from Templeton's to Eora. At the end of September, Horii was so confident Tsukamoto would easily hold Templeton's that he had, with the exception of the Stanley Detachment, withdrawn all his forces from the mountains. These men spent 2 weeks resting in the Kokoda-Oivi area where, closer to their base, they were much easier to feed.
When 2/2nd Battalion forced Tsukamoto's sudden retreat, Horii was badly placed to do anything about it. He rushed troops into the Eora village position, his last prepared defence and the one he did not expect to need. Worse still, the position was designed for a much larger force than Horii was able to send.
Towards the end of the action, there was a weakly held gap in the centre of the Japanese position that the Australians never found. In hindsight, it is clear that there was an opportunity here for Allen to throw his entire force at Eora and perhaps take it before Japanese reinforcements arrived. He did not do so. Allen's one brigade attack of 22 to 23 October was insufficient for the task.
By 24 October, Japanese reinforcements had, to a degree, stabilised their situation at Eora. However, this whole third phase of the fighting should be seen as a desperate Japanese attempt to recover from the parlous circumstances created by 2/2nd Battalions attack on 20 October.
Under pressure from Generals MacArthur and Blamey for advancing too slowly, Allen directed the 16th Brigade commander, John Edward Lloyd, to try a flanking attack around the Japanese right. This took time. It was not until 28 October that the key to the Japanese defences, the high ground on their right from where their artillery dominated the battlefield, was threatened.
Meanwhile, there were developments on the Japanese side.
Owing to yet another reverse at Guadalcanal, Hyakutake ordered Horii to fall back towards his coastal base.
While the Japanese were withdrawing from Eora, the Australians struck on 28 October.
The Japanese guns and the wounded had left the previous day, but the Japanese battalion holding the right of their line was caught at the worst moment in the act of withdrawing. It suffered heavy casualties, but Australian pressure along the front of the Japanese line was insufficient, and the rest of the Japanese force escaped to Kokoda.
The result
For 2 weeks, the Australians were attacking carefully prepared defences, so it is no surprise that their casualties were higher than those of the defenders.
At the Second Battle of Eora Creek and Templeton's Crossing, from 13 to 28 October, the Australians suffered 412 battle casualties against 244 Japanese. That almost one-third of the Japanese casualties were lost on the last day of fighting, when they were caught while retreating, is a measure of the success of 2/3rd Battalion's attack on Eora Heights.
With their victory at Eora-Templeton's Crossing, it was apparent the Australians would soon retake Kokoda. With the Kokoda airstrip in their hands, the supply problems that had dogged the Australian advance so far would be solved.
Kokoda recaptured 2 November 1942
The first Australians to re-enter Kokoda were the men of a patrol led by Lieutenant Frederick Winkle of 2/6 Independent Company.
In the morning fog on 25 October 1942, while the 2 armies fought at Eora-Templeton's 25 km to the south, Winkle, having come from an Australian patrol base in the Yodda valley, crossed the Kokoda airstrip and entered Kokoda government station. There he saw a few Japanese gathered around a fire. Unobserved, Winkle and his men investigated further. Eventually, they were fired on and withdrew.
The official date of the recapture of Kokoda, however, is 2 November 1942, when the Australians returned permanently. On that day a patrol from 2/31st Battalion, the vanguard of Maroubra Force, entered Kokoda Government Station to find the Japanese had left 2 days before. By the afternoon, the whole battalion had arrived and secured the area, also capturing Kokoda village, 2 km away to the east on the track leading to the north coast.
The recapture of Kokoda signifies an important step in ejecting the Japanese from Papua. Its practical importance was in the recapture of the airstrip, the only one between Port Moresby and the north coast. The Japanese had not used the airstrip, and the grass was almost a metre high. Cutting this and removing the obstacles the Japanese had placed took time.
By 4 November, planes from Port Moresby were regularly landing. Now Maroubra Force had a steady stream of supplies and reinforcements coming in and the wounded and sick could be flown out.
On 3 November, the Maroubra Force commander, General George Vasey, marked the occasion with a flag-raising ceremony witnessed by the 25th Brigade. The same flag was later raised to mark Australian victories at Buna-Gona, Sattleberg and Wareo.
Battle of Oivi–Gorari 4 to 11 November 1942
As a result of the decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese at Oivi-Gorari, they abandoned their plan to take Port Moresby and turned their attention to holding their base at Buna-Gona.
After the recapture of Kokoda on 2 November, 7th Australian Division, under the command of Vasey, turned east towards the sea. The next Australian objective was to take the main Japanese base in Papua at Buna-Gona. The South Seas Detachment, commanded by General Horii Tomitaro, stood their ground at Oivi to prevent this.
By the capture of Kokoda airstrip, Vasey had gained a huge advantage.
Previously the Australians, attacking through the mountains, were inadequately supplied by Papuan carriers or inefficient airdrops. Now they had an airstrip just 16 km from Oivi. Food and ammunition were no longer scarce, and the wounded were flown to Port Moresby in a half-hour flight as opposed to a 10-day carry.
The 7th Division committed 3,700 men at Oivi-Gorari. Its 2 brigades, with 7 infantry battalions in all, had been weakened by earlier fighting in the mountains and were reduced to two-thirds strength.
All Japanese fighting troops were assembled on one battlefield for the first time in Papua.
Also reduced by casualties and sickness, the South Seas Detachment was able to muster 2,800 men. They were divided between 41 Infantry Regiment and 144 Infantry Regiment, both with attachments of engineers and mountain artillery.
On the hills above Oivi, 41 Regiment was in an entrenched position carefully prepared several weeks before. The Japanese soldiers had 7 guns, and their task was to halt the Australian advance. With them was one battalion of 144 Regiment.
Further east, in reserve at Gorari, was the rest of 144 Regiment. And behind that again was the South Seas Detachment headquarters. From Gorari, 144 Regiment could move to reinforce Oivi directly, or to either flank should the Australians succeed in getting around the Oivi position.
Unaware that the Japanese planned to make a stand, the Australian 16th Brigade was surprised to encounter 41 Regiment on 4 November. For the next 3 days, the Australians tried to break into this position or to work around its flanks. Neither succeeded. The Japanese position on Oivi Heights was far too strong for 16 Brigade.
Fortunately, the Australians did not have to try again. On 7 November, Vasey ordered a halt to attacks on Oivi as events had unfolded favourably for the Australians elsewhere.
The other Australian brigade, the 25th, had been heading east on a parallel track to the south of 16th Brigade. Led by 2/1st Battalion, which was attached to the 25th Brigade, the soldiers were seeking a way into the Japanese rear.
Despite losing a day by missing the Waju track junction and having to retrace its steps, on 6 November, the 2/1st Battalion was ready to turn north towards Gorari. Vasey decided to throw his main weight, 4 infantry battalions, behind the route discovered by 2/1st Battalion while the 3 battalions in front of Oivi pinned the enemy there.
Horii was soon aware that there were Australians advancing along the southern track. He moved his reserve, the main body of 144 Regiment, towards them. At Baribe, 144's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hiroshi, selected an all-round defensive position astride the track.
Brigadier Ken Eather's 21st Brigade encountered the Japanese at Baribe on 8 November. The brigade was able to surround Tsukamoto with 2 battalions while the other 2 pressed on north towards Gorari.
On 9 November, the 2/33rd Battalion fought 1/144, which Horii had ordered back from Oivi to hold Gorari.
The other Australian battalion turned east from Gorari and attacked the South Seas Detachment headquarters. Horii came under their fire while directing a counterattack of headquarters personnel.
It was obvious to Horii that his entire position was compromised.
Worse still, early in the morning of 10 November, the Japanese were much too disorganised to respond efficiently to Horii's orders to retreat the whole force east beyond the Kumusi River.
Tsukamoto never received the order but decided for himself that the only option was to cut his way through the surrounding Australian infantry. This he succeeded in doing, at great cost.
Colonel Yazawa, commanding at Oivi, ignored Horii's order to serve as a rearguard while the rest of the force retreated. Instead, he slipped out of Oivi undetected by 16th Brigade, took his regiment north across Oivi Creek and, avoiding contact with the Australians and eventually made it to the coast.
In Battle of Oivi–Gorari, the Australians lost 121 dead and 225 wounded.
At least 430 Japanese were killed, and about the same number were wounded. All 15 Japanese artillery pieces were lost as, in the chaos of retreat, none could be got back across the Kumusi River. These guns had given the Japanese a great advantage in the fighting in the Owen Stanley Range and were sorely missed by the Japanese in later fighting at Buna-Gona.
Experiences of Australians
Kokoda Front Line! documentary
Filmmaker Damien Parer captured impressions of Australians during the Kokoda Campaign. He was embedded with Australian defence forces in 1942 and filmed their retreat after Isurava.
Parer was forced to leave behind most of his equipment. The rolls of film he saved became the basis for his award-winning documentary, Kokoda Front Line!
The film brought home to Australians the conditions soldiers faced on the track. Parer recorded the soldiers' experiences of fighting in the jungle. He filmed close to the action and sometimes in front of it.
Watch our short film, Damien Parer: Stories of Service.
Bob Iskov's veteran story
Robert (Bob) Francis Iskov joined the Australian Imperial Force in 1940. He served with the 2/14th Australian Infantry Battalion in the Middle East. Then he arrived with his unit at the Kokoda front line in time for the Battle of Isurava. In the long retreat to Imita Ridge, like many others, he was cut off from his unit in the jungle.
Listen to our oral history interview with Robert (Bob) Francis Iskov.
Sources
- Australian War Memorial, Kokoda Trail Campaign, undated, https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/E84663
- DVA 2012, Kokoda: Exploring the Second World War Campaign in Papua New Guinea, Canberra. https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/resources/kokoda-exploring-second-world-war-campaign-papua-new-guinea
Glossary
- Allies
- artillery
- bombardment
- casualty
- detachment
- infantry
- offensive
- sapper